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The recent experience of nation building in Iraq, and more so in Afghanistan, calls for a 
deeper analysis of the pre-conditions for establishing an appropriate form of governance 
in post-conflict ethnically divided societies. While Afghanistan’s democracy has become 
increasingly associated with the unwanted imposition of western liberal values, the need 
to build stable governance there raises critical questions about which form of governance 
is the best social fit for a given society. This thesis seeks to explore the relationship 
between the decentralization of governance and stability in deeply fragmented societies. 
Our research also seeks to validate the tenets of consociational democracy.  
Drawing on lessons from six contemporary post-conflict cases, we conclude that a 
decentralized framework offers a more viable option than any other currently being 
proposed for deeply divided societies. Our findings suggest that the steadfast adherence 
to consociational democracy tenets and tailored decentralization of governance functions 
were consistent with the achievement of social fit in post-conflict ethnically divided 
countries. Although the involvement of external actors, economic growth or decline, and 
other geopolitical considerations can delay stability or serve as a catalyst for instability, it 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION    
A. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
 For the citizens of Afghanistan, its ten-year process of democratization in a 
centralized form has proven bitterly disappointing in its failure to deliver justice, equity, 
or services. Democracy itself has become increasingly associated with the unwanted 
imposition of western liberal values. The hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of aid 
pumped into the country by the United States and other donor nations have yet to yield 
the necessary degree of assured stability that would support a transition to independent 
governance from 2014 onwards. The recent experience of nation building in Iraq, and 
more so in Afghanistan, calls for a deeper analysis of the pre-conditions for establishing a 
particular type of governance in post-conflict ethnically divided societies. 
Good governance is defined by effectiveness in the administration of sovereignty, 
legitimacy, justice, respect, and trust through the perception and sentiments of those who 
are governed.1 Gaining legitimacy is by far the biggest challenge for a fledgling state in 
the aftermath of a conflict. The problem can be compounded when the government is 
externally imposed and “social fit” is lacking.2 The social acceptance of a particular form 
of governance is complicated further when a society is plagued by unresolved internal 
conflict and strife derived from its inherent heterogeneity. Whether the heterogeneity is 
manifested in differences of class, culture, political party, race, religion, or ethnicity, 
groups of people will inevitably perceive or feel governance is unacceptable in one form 
or another and without regard for the government that exists.  
For ethnically divided countries, the divisions are entrenched in society, 
especially when they have been the source of countless conflicts and the malicious 
subjugation and extermination of human beings during periods of ethnic cleansing. In 
                                                 
1 Robert Jones, “USSOCOM Strategic Appreciation” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, 1 March 2012).  
2 In their thesis, John D. Bishop and Michael J. George argue that the people’s social acceptance of a 
post-conflict government is critical to fostering long-term stability. For more, read John D. Bishop and 
Michael J. George, “Governing in a Post-Conflict Society:  Social Fit” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2011). 
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addition to the intrinsic internal conflict and inhumane treatment as sources of ongoing 
problems, in many cases the state has proven inept at arbitrating and external actors have 
done little better. Although the hard-handed, authoritarian regimes have sometimes 
managed to quell revolutionary sentiment for periods of time, one need not look further 
than the Arab Spring movement in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 and 2012 to 
see the eventual decline of such regimes. Although history offers examples of ethnic 
divisions resolved through the creation of new states, the dispersion of ethnicities, or the 
immersion of ethnicities within the larger culture or nationality, these methods of 
resolution have proven to be impractical, unethical, or impossible in some countries 
within the context of the modern world.   
This thesis will address the problems with governance in post-conflict ethnically 
divided countries by studying governance frameworks of failed or failing states where 
such turmoil persists, as well as some of the cases where governance has managed to 
foster stability in the society. 
B. BACKGROUND  
 Democratization and the democratic peace theory headlined the 2002 U.S. 
National Security Strategy. The democratic peace theory is based on the belief that 
democracies are less prone to conflict with other democracies.3 The strategy and implicit 
theory led the U.S. and International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) to the 
subsequent construction of a “top-down” and highly centralized democratic form of 
governance in Afghanistan. After a decade of coaxing, cajoling, and nearly $100 billion 
of U.S. investment,4 in January 2012 Afghanistan experienced its largest protests since 
the fall of the Taliban in 2001,5 and its government’s legitimacy is in question as it has 
failed to address the country’s instability.  
                                                 
3 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, no. 3 
(Summer, 1983):  227. 
4 “Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan,” June 8, 2011, accessed March 5, 2012, 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SPRT%20112–21.pdf.    
5 Thomas Ruttig, “Afghanistan’s ‘Cumulative’ Protests and the West’s Dilemma,” Afghanistan 
Analysts Network, January 3, 2012, accessed March 5, 2012, http://aan-
afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2567.      
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While legitimate governance and stability in Afghanistan are far from being a 
reality, this has not always been the case.6  Currently, a large divide or gap exists 
between the central government and the majority of the people that live in rural villages. 
The civil society, which is essentially village-oriented, views international actors as 
upholding the power of the Afghan government and its “top-down” decision-making 
processes while imposing a superficial democracy without a truly representative 
foundation. The Afghan people view the present form of democratic governance as an 
imported western concept thrust upon them.7 In fact, Afghans have always had a form of 
village governance called the Malik system. One of the important reasons for the failure 
of the Afghan government to achieve legitimacy is essentially its lack of “social 
fit.”8Democracy for Afghanistan in the twenty-first century was never contextualized and 
is unlikely to take root in its present form as an acceptable western liberal democracy. 
Key elements of the existing civil society, like the Shura, Jirga, and the Malik system, 
have been largely ignored during the development of Afghanistan’s government 
infrastructure. While there are few practical options that remain open for legitimizing the 
Afghan government before the impending withdrawal of U.S. and ISAF forces in the 
coming years, the Afghan case, along with those of other post-conflict ethnically divided 
countries, offers an opportunity to identify some of the key conditions that should be 
considered in formulating a suitable governance proposal for other post-conflict 
ethnically divided societies. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION  
Under what conditions is governance likely to lead to stability in post-conflict 
ethnically divided countries?  To answer this we intend to examine the validity of the 
following propositions: 
• If governance accommodates existing ethnic diversity through autonomy, 
proportional representation, and a suitable coalition, then it is more likely to 
                                                 
6 Thomas Barfield, “Afghan Paradoxes,” in Afghan Endgames, eds. Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla 
(Washington, DC:  Georgetown University Press, 2012), 39.  
7 Ruttig, “Afghanistan’s ‘Cumulative’ Protests and the West’s Dilemma.”   
8 Bishop and George, “Governing in a Post-Conflict Society:  Social Fit,” 38.   
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foster stability through a balanced power-sharing agreement amongst the 
various stakeholders. 
• A centralized approach to the governance construct is likely to be less 
successful than a decentralized, “bottom-up” approach in ensuring enduring 
stability. 
D. SCOPE    
The scope of this thesis concerns the governance frameworks and specific social 
conditions pertaining to stable governance in post-conflict ethnically divided countries. 
The United States Special Operations Command’s 2012 Strategic Appreciation starts 
with the premise that “good governance nurtures stability; poor governance triggers 
revolution.”9  However, in any assessment of good governance, it must follow that while 
the effectiveness of governance can be perceived and is part of the stability equation, it is 
often how individuals feel about their situation that drives instability. Although this 
notion could preclude the relevance of rationally and systematically prescribing any 
particular form of governance for a given society or population, we postulate that there 
are inherent characteristics in post-conflict ethnically divided countries that require a 
more decentralized form of governance for long-term stability. We acknowledge that 
overall political stability is often affected by a wide array of factors such as economic 
development, topological factors, geopolitical interests, as well as the degree of 
heterogeneity (religious, ethnic, class, etc.) reflected in society. However, we limit our 
research to the ties between the social aspects and the type of governance framework 
adopted to foster stability in post-conflict ethnically divided societies as our initial 
literature review suggests a void when it comes to these dimensions of governance. 
E. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Our initial literature review regarding stable governance in heterogeneous 
societies led us to a number of references about consociational democracy and 
decentralized governance. While consociationalism dates back to 1917 when it was first 
seen in the Netherlands, it has only been implemented in handful of countries, but has 
                                                 
9 Jones, “USSOCOM Strategic Appreciation.”  
 5 
proven successful as an administrator of lasting peace in post-conflict societies.10 Arend 
Lijphart, credited as the founding theorist of consociational democracy, observes that 
“political culture and social culture are empirically related to political stability.”  As he 
groups democracies into several categories corresponding to their political institutions 
and the relative homogeneity of their respective populations, he distinguishes a deviant 
category, “consociational democracies,” that refers to the fragmented but stable 
democracies of the European Low Countries.11Our extended research will draw upon the 
four political institutions of consociational democracy: a grand coalition, a mutual veto, 
proportional representation, and segmental autonomy.12  We will also determine the 
conditions under which these aspects, along with decentralization, could provide stable 
governance in other post-conflict ethnically divided countries.  
In the process of validating our propositions, we will narrow down a field of 
ethnically-divided countries and select those countries that have experienced internal 
conflict over the past fifty years as a result of societal divisions. We will then examine 
key aspects of their governance frameworks to determine whether they have either 
fostered stability or caused instability. We will measure the centralization of governance 
in terms of the degree of autonomy of local entities (province, district, etc.), the 
proportional representativeness to be found and the legislative coalition’s social fit with 
the people. This thesis will extend social fit theory13by identifying common conditions 
among post-conflict ethnically divided countries and identifying a more stable form of 
governance for such societies.  
                                                 
10 Helga Malmin Binningsbo, “Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-
Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace after Civil War?” January 7, 2005, accessed 
March 5, 2012, http://home.aubg.bg/students/DNH110/AUBG%20Classes 
/Spring%202012/Research%20Methods/Readings/Logit_regression_example.pdf.  
11 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969): 208.  
12 Binningsbo, “Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace,” 2.  
13 Bishop and George, “Governing in a Post-Conflict Society:  Social Fit,” 38.    
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F. CASE STUDY SELECTION 
In order to prioritize a selection of countries for a broad-spectrum analysis of 
governance frameworks, the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Indices from 200614 and 
201115 were used to identify the 177 least stable countries based on twelve key political, 
social, and economic conflict risk indicators and over 100 sub-indicators.16  The breadth 
and depth of this analysis, while based solely on the Fund for Peace’s proprietary 
Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST), offers the most rigorous available 
examination of the relevant characteristics for studying governance in post-conflict 
ethnically divided countries. Although CAST is a fairly recent innovation and limits its 
analysis to the past decade (with its first assessment completed in 2005), the tool is used 
here as a mechanism for numerically illuminating the degree of conflict risk that exists 
within a country and for capturing changes in the overall stability snapshot of a country 
using a more empirical and systematic (than qualitative) approach. Therefore, while it 
may be argued, citing insufficient data or erroneous algorithms, that the indices and 
rankings themselves potentially offer an inaccurate calibration of the degree of conflict 
risk that actually exists within a given country or comparatively between two countries, 
the Failed States Index provides one of the most objective means for measuring a 
particular country’s stability (including its composite indices) over time. To the degree a 
similar quantity and quality of data can be acquired and analyzed for all countries and 
other time periods, the Failed States Index can provide greater resolution about the long-
term effects and viability of a specific country’s governance design towards addressing 
post-conflict ethnic fractionalization and minimizing the risk of conflict that exists. 
In considering countries with a high ethnic fractionalization, three of the twelve 
indices comprising the Failed States Index were determined to be most representative of 
the degree to which ethnic division has manifested itself as a conflict risk in society: a 
                                                 
14 The Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index 2006,” 2006, accessed July 18, 2012, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2006.   
15 The Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index 2011,” accessed July 18, 2012, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-11–14-fs-failedstatesindex2011–1106p.pdf.   
16 The Fund for Peace, “Conflict Assessment Indicators,” 2011, accessed July 18, 2012, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-10–97-ca-conflictassessmentindicators-1105c.pdf.  
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legacy of vengeance seeking (group grievance or paranoia), the criminalization and/or de-
legitimization of the state, and the rise of factionalized elites.17 Although higher values in 
several other indices, including uneven economic development along group lines, the 
suspension of the rule of law, and widespread violation of human rights, may also be 
present in countries with high ethnic fractionalization, those indices are often also 
indicative of economic realities or an authoritarian system of government independent of 
the country’s ethnic divisions. Thus, in selecting countries for further analysis we relied 
upon a critical review of the three aforementioned representative indices in relation to the 
overall stability score.   
In order to determine whether a country’s structure of governance could be 
reasonably assumed to have played a role in marginalizing the existing ethnic tensions, 
we considered three relational possibilities. In the first scenario, a corresponding increase 
or decrease in the three representative indices, in concert with an increase or decrease in 
the overall stability score, provided sufficient confirmation that some alteration in the 
country’s governance either increased or decreased the conflict risk associated with the 
ethnic divisions in society. Alternatively, a negligible, opposing, or inconsistent 
movement of the three indices, with respect to the movement of the overall stability 
score, provided an inconclusive determination about whether governance or some other 
demonstrable internal or external conditions could be uniquely attributed with increasing 
or decreasing the conflict risk associated with the ethnic fractionalization in the country. 
In the last scenario, a country with high ethnic fractionalization but relatively low conflict 
risk scores associated with the three indices revealed a society in which the ethnic 
tensions were minimized either through some means of governance or some other 
unifying factor or factors (e.g., national homogenization, economic development, etc.). 
While a country in the last scenario could also be studied to determine whether its 
governance design might be credited with effectively addressing the potential conflict 
risk of internal ethnic fractionalization, this thesis has focused on selecting countries that 
                                                 
17 The twelve conflict assessment indicators include demographic pressures, refugees and internally 
displaced people (IDP), group grievance, human flight and brain drain, uneven economic development, 
poverty and economic decline, legitimacy of the state, public services, human rights and rule of law, 
security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention. 
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meet the first set of criteria in order to further analyze how governance was altered to try 
to decrease the conflict risk associated with an ethnically divided society.18 
 To narrow our list of potential case studies, we began by identifying a current and 
verifiable index of ethnic fractionalization scores. James Fearon published such an index 
in his 2003 study which updated the previously best known and widely used ethnographic 
study provided by Soviet ethnographers in the early 1960s, and published as Atlas 
Naradov Mira in 1964. In his index, Fearon’s ethnic measures agree with a 2002 
fractionalization study of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups conducted by Alesina et 
al., but disagree with a series of fractionalization measures (1961–1985) carried out by 
Roeder in 2002 based on the aforementioned Soviet ethnographic sources.19  This thesis 
has used Fearon’s ethnic fractionalization scores because of his more pertinent and 
contextualized definition of ethnicity. 
In his study, Fearon modifies the Soviet team’s definition of ethnic group in order 
to standardize the use of ethnicity for the purposes of analyzing conflict between groups. 
While the definition of ethnicity in Atlas Naradov Mira is primarily based on sharing a 
language, but occasionally uses race and national origin, Fearon and David Laitin argue 
that the definition of ethnic group must be based in ordinary or everyday language.20  
Thus, they argue that “in common speech a group may be designated as ‘ethnic’ if the 
group is larger than a family and membership in the group is reckoned primarily by a 
descent rule.”21  To elucidate the definition and assist with the construction of a country 
list, Fearon analyzes the extent to which an ethnicity is a group based on the following 
seven prototypical ethnic group features: 
                                                 
 18 Although the aforementioned process for country case selection limits the scope of analysis to 
three of the twelve factors of stability and the period of time between 2006 and 2011, the Failed States 
Index’s comprehensive analysis of conflict risk helps bolster our conclusions. In the case of countries with 
high ethnic fractionalization, where that fractionalization contributes significantly to the country’s risk of 
conflict, any significant increase or decrease in the country’s conflict risk is assumed to be primarily a 
result of the governance design. Limiting the scope of study by either excluding factors of instability that 
showed negligible or modest changes during the same time period, and excluding other factors. 
19 James D. Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Economic Growth 8 
(2003):  196.  
20 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ordinary Language and External Validity,” September 
2000, accessed July 18, 2012, http://web.ceu.hu/cps/bluebird/eve/statebuilding/fearon-laitin.pdf.   
21 Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” 200.  
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• Membership in the group is reckoned primarily by descent by both members 
and non-members. 
• Members are conscious of group membership and view it as normatively and 
psychologically important to them. 
• Members share some distinguishing cultural features, such as common 
language, religion, and customs. 
• These cultural features are held to be valuable by a large number of members 
of the group. 
• The group has a homeland, or at least “remembers” one. 
• The group has a shared and collectively represented history as a group. 
Further, this history is not wholly manufactured, but has some basis in fact. 
• The group is potentially “stand alone” in a conceptual sense—that is, it is not 
a caste or caste-like group (e.g. European nobility or commoners).22    
Although all of Fearon’s ethnic groups do not meet all seven of his prototypical features, 
his scrupulous assessment and contextual definition provide a fairly comprehensive 
representation of the fragmentation by ethnic group within a country. 
 In order to systematically identify countries for further analysis, we pair Fearon’s 
ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity scores (by region and ethnic 
fractionalization)23 with the three conflict risk indicators previously described from both 
the 2006 and 2011 Failed States indices. For the purpose of understanding how systems 
of governance did or did not effectively deal with inherent ethnic divisiveness, we based 
our preliminary country case selection on the following prioritized criteria:  significant 
increase or decrease in all three of the indices representing group tensions, a 
corresponding increase or decrease in the overall stability index, and a high ethnic 
fractionalization score. Doing this generated seventeen countries in four different regions 
(Table 1). To lend more credence to the importance of governance design over other 
potentially region-specific stabilizing or destabilizing factors, we include countries 
representing each of the four regions. Additionally, while the process could have led us to 
select countries that were all substantial movers in terms of declining stability or 
substantial movers towards increasing stability, we attempted to achieve a balance. 
Consequently, we selected six countries for further study (Table -2). 
                                                 
22 Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” 201.  









2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011
Afghanistan 99.8/10 107.5/7 9.1 9.3 8.3 9.7 8 9.4 3/23      0.751 1/23
India 70.4/93 79.3/76 6.9 8.2 4.8 5.8 5.7 6.8 2/23      0.811 2/23
Nepal 95.4/20 93.7/27 9.2 9 9.2 7.9 9 8 5/23      0.677 5/23
Myanmar 96.5/18 98.3/18 9 8.7 9.2 9.7 8 8.3 10/23    0.522 9/23
Indonesia 89.2/32 81.6/64 6.3 6.6 6.7 6.7 7.9 7 3/23      0.766 6/23
Nigeria 94.4/22 99.9/14 9.1 9.3 9 9 9 9.5 16/43    0.805 4/43
Rwanda 92.9/24 91.0/34 9 8.2 8.7 7.1 8.9 8.4 43/43    0.18 43/43
Zimbabwe 108.9/5 107.9/6 8.5 9 8.9 9.3 8.5 9.6 38/43    0.366 40/43
Somalia 105.9/7 113.4/1 8 9.5 10 9.8 9.8 9.8 15/43    0.812 32/43
Sudan 112.3/1 108.7 9.7 9.9 9.5 9.4 9.1 9.9 29/43    0.708 3/43
Kenya 88.6/34 98.7/16 6.7 8.7 7.3 8.9 7.6 8.8 11/43   0.852 9/43
Bosnia 88.5/35 80.9/69 8.6 8.4 8.1 7.6 8.7 9.2 3/31      0.681 26/31
Kyrgyzstan 90.3/28 91.8/31 7 8.3 8.3 9 7.9 8.3 4/31      0.679 1/31
Kazakhstan 71.9/88 70.2/107 5.1 6 7.5 7.2 7.7 7.7 14/31    0.664 2/31
Uzbekistan 94.4/23 88.3/39 7.5 7.4 9.3 8.4 9.1 8.7 6/31      0.485 6/31
Lebanon 80.5/65 87.7/43 7.8 8.7 6.4 7 8.3 8.8 1/19      0.78 14/19
















Table 1.   Country Case Selection – Preliminary Selection 
 
Increasing Stability Decreasing Stability
India Afghanistan
Rwanda Kenya
Bosnia Lebanon  
 
Table 2.   Country Case Selection – Final 
G. THESIS OUTLINE 
 This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between centralization or 
decentralization of governance and stability in deeply fragmented societies. Our research 
also seeks to validate the tenets of consociational democracy. The thesis draws on lessons 
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from six contemporary post-conflict cases for this purpose. Chapter II broadly discusses 
consociational democracy and its relevance to post-conflict deeply divided societies. This 
is followed by an analysis in Chapter III of the process of decentralization as an eventual 
outcome of adopting consociational democracy. The impact of decentralization on 
stability and development is also explored. In Chapter IV, the six selected cases are 
analyzed for the impact of their governance frameworks on political stability and their 
ability to meet group aspirations. In the concluding Chapter, the findings from each of the 
six case studies are summarized to arrive at the features of a governance framework that 
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II. DEMOCRACY IN POST-CONFLICT ETHNICALLY DIVIDED 
SOCIETIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Does democracy lead to stability? While empirical evidence does not 
convincingly show any preference between democratic institutions and more autocratic 
regimes for producing greater stability,24 recent events associated with the Arab Spring in 
the Middle East and North Africa, as well as persistent conflict within countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and a few other locations in the world (e.g. Burma, Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Kazakhstan), reveal a growing affinity for greater representativeness, individual 
rights, and inclusive governance. Repressive dictatorships and autocracies continue to be 
spurned by populations given their failure to deliver political goods and meet people’s 
developmental needs. Many populations seeking a change in governance begin down the 
path towards a new democracy with elections and constitutional reform only to find that 
the newly implanted government does not offer sufficient representativeness or that the 
inclusive governance that was promised or envisioned by minority groups is not 
delivered. While democracy remains the preferred form of governance for the United 
Nations,25 and the United States in particular, democracy often fails to take root in 
heterogeneous societies where a democratic government is no more representative or 
inclusive than an autocracy would be, and usually less stable in the near-term than 
continuing with autocratic government (or a mixed regime).26   
 The different make-up of countries around the world has made it clear that 
democracy, in and of itself, is not sufficient to address the respective needs of the 
sometimes multi-polar entities that comprise a country’s populace. Although some 
countries have been modeled or remodeled to be like liberal democracies in the United 
States or Europe and have achieved lasting stability, no single form of democracy has 
                                                 
24 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 
(1995):  81. 
25 United Nations, “Democracy and the United Nations,” accessed July 26, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/democracyday/pdf/infokit.pdf.   
26 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” 81–83.  
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emerged as the preferred model for countries that have been plagued by internal conflict. 
It is almost as if a democratic institution must be able to achieve “social fit,”27 taking into 
account the unique composition and corresponding aspirations of its constituent groups. 
Consequently, this chapter suggests that there needs to be a more nuanced application of 
democratic governance and the chapter outlines how the key foundational democratic 
concepts could be applied given various forms of democratic governance.  
B. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 
The classical and dominant model of governance in most of Europe and the 
United States continues to be the democratic nation-state. A more liberal form of 
democracy has tended to work where the population is presumed to be ethnically, 
linguistically, and culturally homogenous, or has at least resolved its most salient societal 
divisions through a process of assimilation and the adjudication of individual grievances. 
This holds in most European countries and the United States, where centuries of ethnic 
homogenization and cultural assimilation have allowed strong centralized governments to 
maintain internal stability and transition fairly smoothly from one leader and 
administration to the next.28 The question for democratic forms of governance is whether 
the same ethnic homogenization and cultural assimilation can be replicated in societies 
with much deeper ethnic divisions and historical conflicts based on those divisions. The 
tremendous resilience of such differences within numerous countries in the Middle East, 
Africa, and Asia, despite concerted efforts towards assimilation, have left their 
governments and the international community unable to peacefully resolve internal 
conflicts through their current approaches to democratic governance.   
Sammy Smooha, in his comparison between types of democracies (Table 3), 
analyzes how each type addresses individual versus collective rights. In addition to 
individual and republican liberal democracies, he identifies three alternative forms of 
democracy: multicultural, consociational, and ethnic, each of which uses different 
mechanisms to address the potential conflict that thrives on the heterogeneity. In a 
                                                 
27 Bishop and George, “Governing in a Post-Conflict Society:  Social Fit,” 11–13.  
28 Sammy Smooha, “Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict Management in Ethnically Divided 
Societies,” Nations and Nationalism 4, no. 4 (2002):  424. 
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multicultural democracy, governance is “grounded [in] the recognition of ethnic 
differences but without making them official and without institutionalizing the essential 
mechanisms of consociationalism.”29  Examples include post-apartheid South Africa and 
the Netherlands. An ethnic democracy, on the other hand, such as the type evolving in the 
post-Communist states of Eastern-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, “falls in 
between a consociational democracy and a non-democracy” with a somewhat 
“contradictory combination of democracy for all with ethnic ascendancy.”30  Although 
multicultural and consociational democracies both share some form of civic equality, 
ethnic democracy has not proven viable as a governance option for long-term stability 
because it violates the basic democratic tenet of equality as a means of addressing the 
ethnic divisions within society.31   
By virtue of the collective rights a consociational democracy recognizes, it offers 
a higher degree of assured representativeness in deeply divided societies where minorities 
are under a constant threat of marginalization. Under these circumstances the best suited 
alternative to a liberal democracy is a consociational democracy. While individual and 
republican liberal democracies ignore cultural differences and do not provide for 
collective rights to minority groups, consociational democracy provides minorities with 
maximal recognition, separate institutions, autonomy, representation, and equal status. 
According to Arend Lijphart, such a society characterized by sharp cleavages and few 
overlapping memberships needs a radically different political system than do societies 
with cross-cutting cleavages and overlapping loyalty. A post-conflict society, with high 
levels of distrust and suspicion between the parties and with extensive security 
challenges, can reach a stable peace if its political institutions resemble those in a 
consociational democracy as opposed to those in a liberal democracy.32   
                                                 
29 Smooha, “Types of Democracy,” 425. 
30 Smooha, “Types of Democracy,” 425.  
31 Smooha, “Types of Democracy,” 430. 
32 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 25. 
 16 
 
Table 3.   Comparison between Types of Democracies 
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C. WHAT IS CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY?  
 Consociational democracy recognizes group identities derived from ethnic, 
cultural, and linguistic differences and grants collective rights in addition to individual 
rights. This type of democracy demonstrates four unique characteristics in the process of 
recognizing and alleviating group differences in a country. The first and most important 
is a grand coalition with representatives from all the significant groups in the society. The 
other three consist of proportional representation, segmental autonomy, and a mutual 
veto.33 
 1. Grand Coalition  
The main idea behind a grand coalition is that policy choices shall not only have 
majority support, derived from a partition of society with a numerical majority, but 
support from an overwhelming majority. A strong numerical opposition, which is a 
common feature of a majoritarian “winner takes all” democracy, is thereby avoided. 
When a trust deficit is present between segments after civil war or conflict, the grand 
coalition reflects the notion that one prefers to be represented in government with a 
counterpart, than trust the counterpart to govern with implicit support from the other 
opposing entities.34  To best reflect a country’s composition, the power-sharing or grand 
coalition may take a different form that includes the following: 
• A grand coalition cabinet in parliamentary systems. 
• A grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders in presidential 
systems, and broadly inclusive councils or committees with important 
advisory and coordinating functions.35 
                                                 
33 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 25. 
34 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 31. 
35 Arend Lijphart, Power-sharing in South Africa (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1985), 7. 
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 2. Proportional Representation  
A second tenet of consociational democracy is the proportional distribution of 
influence. The most common use of the proportionality principle is as an instrument to 
distribute seats in the legislature and provide for representation in all institutions of state 
governance, including the judiciary, civil services, public sector undertakings, and the 
army.36  The provisions of the constitution and the electoral system play a key role in 
assuring proportional representation.  
 3. Segmental Autonomy    
In plural societies that are highly fragmented, it may be wise to leave as many 
decisions as possible concerning the different segments to the different segments 
themselves.37  Issues of particular concern to minority factions may include decisions 
about religion, language, and education. The application of segmental autonomy can be 
based on the demographic distribution of people according to such factors as historical 
self-identification or territorial location. The type of federalism adopted and the degree of 
centralization or decentralization are important aspects of power-sharing that depend on 
the type and extent of divisions in the society. This will be analyzed in greater detail in 
the next chapter and in the case studies. 
 4. Mutual Veto  
The aspect of mutual veto power also provides a crucial element of consociational 
democracy since it enables the minority group (or groups) to block any decision 
detrimental to its (or their) vital interests and self-preservation. There are a number of 
ways to implement a mutual veto so as to legitimize governance solutions for the various 
minority groups in a country. The form is less significant than the spirit of its 
implementation. 
                                                 
36 Lijphart, Power-sharing in South Africa, 38. 
37 Lijphart, Power-sharing in South Africa, 42.  
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D. CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND POST CONFLICT PEACE 
 By applying a quantitative analytical approach, Helga Malmin Binningsbo 
establishes the relationship between power-sharing institutions in post-conflict societies 
and lasting peace. She finds a “positive relationship between consociationalism and 
lasting peace in post-conflict societies.”  Although she finds that a “proportional 
representation system and autonomy, both individually and in combination, increase the 
probability of lasting peace,” her results indicate that the “presence of a grand coalition 
has a negative influence on lasting peace, especially when the grand coalition is the result 
of a power-sharing agreement.”38  While her analysis includes data from more than 166 
instances of conflict between 1985 and 1998, Lijphart disputes her conclusion, attributing 
power-sharing failures to constitution writers’ choice of unsatisfactory rules and 
institutions rather than to power-sharing itself.39  Although Binningsbo and Lijphart, the 
two most prominent consociationalism scholars, disagree about the specific tenet of a 
grand coalition (based on the result of a power-sharing agreement), Lijphart’s objection 
to Binningsbo’s analytical evidence only suggests that the power-sharing agreement was 
not satisfactory to the represented parties. This objection supports the need to tailor each 
of the consociational tenets to the society of the country in question. 
Related to the implementation of other consociational tenets, Binningsbo finds 
lasting peace in conflict-ridden countries where all of the seats in parliament were 
allocated proportionately, authority was decentralized, the institutions were more (rather 
than less) autonomous, and more power-sharing institutions were present. She also 
describes a higher probability of establishing lasting peace when applying such practices 
in smaller countries.40 Binningsbo concludes her analysis by recommending 
decentralization and the granting of territorial autonomy as a sound strategy to terminate 
                                                 
38 Helga Malmin Binningsbo, “Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-sharing 
Institutions Increase the Probability of lasting Peace after Civil War?” (paper prepared for presentation at 
the 13th Annual National Political Science Conference, Hurdalsjoen, Norway, 5–7 January, 2005), 29. 
39 Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” in Journal of Democracy 15, no.2 
(April 2004):99. (96–109). 
40 Binningsbo, “Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace,” 28. 
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violence when practicable.41 The viability and advantages of decentralizing governance 
will be analyzed in the following chapter. 
E. CRITICISM OF CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY 
Several prominent criticisms have been made of consociational democracy. These 
criticisms include its creation of a weak democracy because it tries to force conciliation 
of opposing views that are still held; the laborious decision-making process of a grand 
coalition along with a mutual veto; proportional representation’s inefficiency; the 
costliness of implementing segmental autonomy; and the  lower probability of success in 
the more deeply divided societies of Africa and Asia.42  In response to each of the most 
common criticisms of consociationalism, Lijphart stipulates the conditions under which 
the criticisms are valid and provides pragmatic suggestions about the optimal 
implementation of consociationalism in some of the more deviant cases. 
For instance, in response to the perception of consociational democracy as a weak 
democracy because it militates against there being a strong opposition, Lijphart argues 
that if opposition is supposed to be an active ingredient of the definition of democracy, a 
regular government transition is required. However, this might not be possible in plural 
societies, and the result can ensure that a minority will be permanently excluded from 
government.43 As for the criticisms about the inefficiency and costliness of the core 
tenets of consociationalism, Lijphart agrees with the notion that an adversarial system 
may offer a more viable short-term solution for economic growth and stability, but 
disagrees with the prospects of such a system maintaining stability due to the likely 
spread of inequalities and exclusive governance. Lastly, Lijphart confronts the notion that 
consociationalism will lead to more intergroup differences and competition instead of 
compromise and moderate attitudes. While he accepts the fact that consociationalism will 
not remove more deeply seated societal divisions, he contends that many of the most 
deeply divided countries in Africa and Asia have not even attempted a governance 
                                                 
41 Binningsbo, “Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace,” 29. 
42 Binningsbo, “Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace,” 11. 
43 Binningsbo, “Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace,” 11. 
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solution that has tried to truly implement the core tenets of consociationalism. Again, he 
points to many instances of constitution writers having chosen unsatisfactory rules and 
institutions which set the system up to be a power-sharing failure.44 
F. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES - A 
CONSOCIATIONAL APPROACH  
Lijphart offers a set of recommendations specifying some of the constitutional 
needs of countries with deeply divided societies, such as those with deep ethnic and other 
cleavages. To support his recommendations, Lijphart cites constitutional characteristics 
from the successful implementation of power-sharing solutions in the divided societies in 
Austria, Colombia, Cyprus, India, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland.45  Examples of the importance of power-sharing can also be drawn from the 
positive reception of the representative composition of the Governing Council in Iraq.46  
Lijphart acknowledges the biggest failures with respect to power-sharing systems—
Cyprus (1963) and Lebanon (1975)—are countries with poorly framed constitutional 
provisions.  
Again, while there are certain common features of consociationalism which have 
consistently contributed to a more lasting peace, Lijphart acknowledges that the power-
sharing model must be tailored to the societal dynamics within each country.47  Based on 
Lijphart’s recommendations, the following characteristics of constitutional design will be 
reviewed for our specific case studies of post-conflict ethnically-divided countries: 
 1. The Legislative Electoral System   
Three types of legislative electoral systems are possible: proportional 
representation (PR) systems, majoritarian systems, and intermediate systems. Amongst 
these, PR is best suited for societies with more pronounced divisions due to the fact that, 
in addition to producing proportionality and minority representation, PR treats all ethnic, 
                                                 
44 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 99. 
45 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 97. 
46 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design For Divided Societies,” 99 
47 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 99. 
 22 
racial, religious and even non-communal groups in a completely equal and evenhanded 
manner.48  Majoritarian systems are not suited for societies where divisions are distinct 
and people are already consumed with feelings of insecurity and suspicion, especially in 
post-conflict environments.49  Semi-proportional systems, such as those that have 
adopted the cumulative and limited vote (seen at local and state levels in the U.S.) or the 
single non-transferable vote (SNTV, used in Japan until 1993),50 lack the consistency to 
provide reasonable minority representation. Interestingly, successful mixed systems (e.g., 
those found in Germany and New Zealand) have shown an inclination towards PR and, in 
cases where plurality was preferred over PR (e.g., in Japan, Hungary, and Italy), the 
system has produced an inaccurate or inconsistent representation of minorities. 
Meanwhile, plurality combined with guaranteed representation for only specified 
minorities (as in India) has the potential to result in undesirable competition amongst the 
various groups vying for a secure status.51 
 2. Constituents of PR  
Amongst the various forms of PR, Lijphart proposes the “list PR” system, “in 
which parties present lists of candidates to the voters.”  The “list PR” system is better 
suited to more divided societies because it encourages the formation and maintenance of 
strong and cohesive political parties.52  In a divided society, political stability is closely 
linked to the effectiveness of political parties and their ability to transcend or cross-cut 
ethnic and cultural divisions. In comparison to the alternatives, the “single transferable 
                                                 
48 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 99. 
49 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 104. 
50 All three voting systems involve multi-member election districts. The cumulative vote is similar to 
multi-member district plurality in that a voter has as many votes as there are seats in the district, except that 
each voter is allowed to allocate his or her vote to one or a few of the candidates. The limited vote restricts 
the number of votes to fewer than the number of district seats. The single nontransferable vote is a specific 
type of limited vote in which each voter’s votes are reduced to one.  
51 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 100. 
52 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 101.  
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vote” and the “closed lists system,”53 the “list PR system” scores best in providing the 
most comprehensive representation. Lijphart also proposes multi-member electoral 
districts that are not too large, in order to avoid creating too much distance between 
voters and their representatives.54  
 3. Executive Power-sharing:  Parliamentary or Presidential Government 
In deeply divided countries, the parliamentary form of government makes a broad 
power-sharing executive possible. The presidential form is often discounted by Lijphart 
and most scholars because it is majoritarian in nature, introduces a strong zero-sum or 
“winner take all” element,55 can falter based on the personality or ideology of the 
executive, and has a greater likelihood of producing stalemates.56  Also, the process of 
selecting the cabinet in parliamentary systems tends to facilitate the formation of power-
sharing executives (though this must be written into the constitution). There are two 
options to institutionalize power-sharing while incorporating constitutional provisions to 
facilitate it. The first option involves reserving specific berths for various groups in the 
cabinet (e.g. Belgium). The second option involves linking party representation in the 
parliament to the number of seats in the cabinet (e.g. South Africa).57  While the two 
options exemplify the institutionalization of power-sharing in parliament, other options 
may exist for countries with unique circumstances.  
 4. Cabinet Stability  
The provisions for “vote-of-confidence” and “snap” elections in a parliamentary 
system may lead to cabinet instability, and ultimately, the regime’s instability. Lijphart 
argues that this problem should not be overstated considering the fact that most 
                                                 
53 Single transferable vote systems require voters to rank order individual candidates, and the closed 
lists systems only allow voters to choose parties instead of individual candidates within the list.  
54 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 101. 
55 Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in The 
Failure of Presidential Democracy, ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994), 18. 
56 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 102. 
57 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 103. 
 24 
democracies in the world are parliamentary and not presidential.58  The misuse of these 
two critical provisions can be thwarted by suitable checks and balances in the 
constitution. 
 5. Selecting the Head of State  
In parliamentary systems, the prime minister is usually the head of the 
government, and a monarch or president occupies the position of the ceremonial head of 
state and custodian of the constitution. The choice for deeply divided societies should be 
based on the country’s history and meet specific social fit criteria. The position of head of 
state must be as apolitical as possible. If the country has maintained a history of 
monarchy, the monarch can continue as head of the state with no executive powers and 
political affiliations. Alternatively, a president can be appointed to be the head of state 
based on joint nomination by the prime minister and the leader of the opposition, or 
through confirmation by a two-thirds majority of a joint session of the two houses of 
parliament (as in India).59 
 6. Non-territorial Autonomy  
In cases where divisions in the society are not geographic in nature, autonomy can 
be arranged on a non-territorial basis. Autonomy, for example, can be granted to various 
groups in matters related to religion, education, or language. Such autonomy has been 
implemented effectively in deeply divided societies like India. However, the various 
legislative acts must be framed to maintain the neutrality of the state at the federal 
level.60 
                                                 
58 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 103. 
59 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 104. 
60 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 105. 
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 7. Power-Sharing Beyond the Cabinet and Parliament  
In deeply divided societies, broad representation should be extended beyond the 
cabinet and the legislature to span all of the other branches of government.61  However, 
the provisions of allocating quotas should be carefully arranged so as to preserve a 
meritocracy and prevent the institutionalization of ethnic divisions. The Indian civil 
services provide an example of a healthy balance between representation and 
meritocracy.  
 8. Federalism and Decentralization  
A federal system provides a proven method for providing autonomy in deeply 
divided societies with geographically concentrated communal groups. As a broad 
guideline, Lijphart recommends that the federation be relatively decentralized and that 
the states or provinces be small enough to increase the prospects of homogeneity and 
avoid the dominance of larger states or provinces at the federal level.62  The particular 
application of decentralization will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
                                                 
61 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 105. 
62 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 105. 
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III. DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE IN POST-CONFLICT 
ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES   
A. INTRODUCTION 
 In the post-colonial era, countries contemplating democratic governance have 
struggled to find the ideal balance between centralization and decentralization. Among 
those who argue for decentralization, John Stuart Mill held a very optimistic view, basing 
his democratic decentralization on the twin pillars of participation and local knowledge.63  
Others have promoted decentralization as a way to give greater political representation to 
diverse political, ethnic, religious, and cultural groups without destabilizing the state.64  
Although the notion of decentralization has been discussed generally for many centuries, 
ideas about its application have evolved considerably over the past several decades.   
Until the early 1980s, “government” and “the state” were generally perceived to 
be interchangeable terms. The government was considered to be the institutional 
embodiment of state sovereignty and the dominant source of political and legal decision-
making. In most developing nations during this time, debate over the structure, roles, and 
functions of government focused on the effectiveness of central power and authority to 
promote economic and social progress. People paid less attention to the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of decentralizing authority for sub-national units of 
administration, local government, or other agents of the state.   
In more recent years, the process of globalization has increased interactions 
among governments with varying governance designs. These interactions have also made 




                                                 
63 Peter Blunt and Mark Turner, “Poverty Reduction in Asia Pacific,” Decentralizing Governance, 
eds., G Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2007, 117. 
64 G Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli, “ From Government Decentralization to 
Decentralized Governance,” Decentralizing Governance, eds., G Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. 
Rondinelli, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2007, 7. 
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is distributed and, consequently, have pointed to the need for decentralization as a means 
to prevent the monopolization of public policy by special interests that do not represent 
all sectors.65   
To evaluate the need for, and efficacy of, decentralization, this chapter examines 
the various facets of decentralized governance and the conditions under which 
decentralization is a viable solution for post-conflict ethnically divided societies. The 
viability of decentralization for weak or failed states, and the impact of decentralization 
on political stability and development, will also be reviewed. 
B. WHY IS DECENTRALIZATION DESIRABLE? 
Legitimacy is critical to decentralization as is the understanding that the 
development of solutions to problems (or perspective on what the problems are) is a 
function of the people who conceive of them. While there may be as many potential 
solutions to problems or perspectives as there are people within a given society, 
decentralization aims to maximize the legitimacy of the governance structure, or 
minimize the collective dissatisfaction of people, by distributing a sufficient degree of 
decision-making power to the largest subordinate entity that can agree on how to arrive at 
solutions. While decentralizing governance could seem impractical if one were to take all 
potential perspectives into account, in reality, the general acceptance of a government’s 
legitimacy by its people depends less on how governance matches their individual 
inclinations than on how it bridges their differences. Thus, in divided societies, 
decentralization can allow for collective decision-making at a local level thereby 
avoiding conflict at higher levels over the distribution of opportunities as perceived by 
various groups.   
Traditional centralized governments are not well suited to address the myriad 
different problems and prospective solutions that can be generated at the local level. To 
solve local problems, a system of government must include the greatest degree of input 
from civil society and the private sector. While decentralization is not a panacea for all 
problems related to post-conflict governance in ethnically divided societies, it does offer 
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a scalable tool for considering how the various tenets of functioning governance can best 
be distributed to achieve an optimal balance of power-sharing and autonomy for enduring 
stability.  
For instance, in countries where political boundaries for units of sub-national 
government reflect social boundaries, an otherwise plural society can become 
homogeneous regionally, thereby reducing communal violence, promoting political 
stability, and facilitating the accommodation of diverse interests within the boundaries of 
a single state.66  In fact, most plural societies contain multiple groups divided by 
linguistic, religious, racial, tribal, or class-based identities. In countries with 
geographically concentrated communities marked by administrative boundaries 
distinguishing political units, both federalism and decentralization serve important 
purposes. Such arrangements allow spatially-concentrated groups a considerable degree 
of autonomy to manage their own affairs and to protect the cultural, social, and economic 
interests important in their communities.67  
C. DEFINING DECENTRALIZATION  
Decentralization has been broadly defined as the transfer of authority, 
responsibility, and resources—through deconcentration, delegation, or devolution—from 
the center to lower levels of administration.68  When thought about in the context of a 
state, decentralization refers to each of the following to some degree:   
• Distribution of legislative, executive, and judicial power, or a combination of 
one or more powers, down one or more levels of government (essentially 
delegation). 
• Division of responsibility for particular government functions and services 
between several levels of government (essentially deconcentration). Examples 
include education, policing, water, immigration, health, and the environment.  
• Downward allocation of fiscal authority. 
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• Giving sub-national levels of government the autonomy to make their own 
institutional arrangements, for which they are accountable to their own people, 
with little or no intervention by the central government. 
• Creation of central institutions that involve the sub-national levels of 
government in collective decision-making.69 
The features just listed are often included as a part of distinct arrangements that 
provide a framework for understanding where the authority and decision-making power 
resides. The following four arrangements are those most commonly seen: 
 1. Delegation 
 Downward allocation of power by the central government to other levels of 
government in what remains essentially a unitary state. The central government retains 
authority to withdraw the delegated power or to direct its use.  
 2. Devolution 
 Conferral of legislative and executive (and sometimes judicial) power on other 
levels of government with the intent to grant them substantial autonomy, without the 
complete surrender of formal control by the central government. 
 3. Regional autonomy 
 Conferral of a greater degree of self-government on one or more regions than on 
other parts of the state. 
 4. Federation 
 Division of governing authority between the central government and one or more 
other levels of government in a way that gives each of them overall autonomy in their 
respective areas of responsibility.70  
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D. THE EFFECT OF DECENTRALIZATION ON POWER-SHARING AND 
AUTONOMY   
The aforementioned types of decentralized arrangements are not necessarily 
distinct, but each arrangement should meet the social fit criterion, aligning with the 
cultural, traditional, religious, and ethnic aspirations of the people. In deeply divided 
post-conflict societies, the power-sharing equation and the degree of workable autonomy 
can have a profound effect on stability. Decentralization guarantees a certain degree of 
power distribution and autonomy in an attempt to minimize the potential for conflict 
between groups and increase the potential for stability with the following rationale:  
 1. Curb State Authoritarianism 
 Decentralization can mandate shared power. If the logic of 
decentralization is accepted and implemented correctly, it can diffuse power and provide 
checks and balances on the power of the central government.71  
 2. Reduce the Potential for Conflict 
 Decentralization enables all groups, including and especially minority 
groups, to enjoy some degree of self-governance by providing them a sense of ownership 
in the state and thus a commitment to it. This can be accomplished through formally 
recognized leadership roles, granting them a representative majority status in their parts 
of the country, and offering natural incentives to work constructively within the state.72 
 3. Provide for Political Opportunity and Absorption 
 Decentralization incentivizes warring groups at the sub-national level to 
withdraw from armed conflict and integrate with the political mainstream of society by 
allowing such groups to retain reasonable influence. This concept assumes that a sub-
national group’s representative leadership will be directly accountable to its people, and 
poor performance will erode its popular support.   
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 4. Better Policy Making 
 In a decentralized environment, the proliferation of decision-making units 
at sub-national levels strengthens contextualized public policymaking by encouraging 
creative new solutions to tough problems on a manageable scale. Such an arrangement 
will encourage learning through social innovation and experimentation as governance is 
liberated to deal with complex challenges.73 By leaving day-to-day governance to the 
lower levels, the central government would be left to manage complex and resource-
intensive issues like national security and foreign policy.      
E. DECENTRALIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT  
Resistance to decentralization often comes from a belief that the results are 
potentially less consistent and worse overall than if a central authority were in place. For 
instance, if viewed in isolation, empirical data suggests a negative relationship between 
decentralization and various development variables. Some studies have found that fiscal 
decentralization is generally associated with lower economic growth and greater fiscal 
imbalance.74  Decentralization can lead to increased costs in public infrastructure 
expenditure for services involving local benefits, while an increase in the provision of 
services and infrastructure by private enterprises may only occur when local government 
retains control over (and does not further decentralize) the infrastructure delivery 
process.75   
Although there is no conclusive evidence to suggest a link between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth, a strong correlation exists between the power-
sharing aspect of decentralization and development.76  Likewise, poverty can be created, 
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maintained, and even exacerbated by centralized power that does not protect equality of 
opportunity across various groups within a society. The relationship between power 
brokers and their constituents can affect how resources are distributed, both overtly and 
through corrupt officials.77  Decentralization can aid in the amicable redistribution of 
power by providing the poor with more political representation through local leaders. 
However, a decentralization process devoid of adequate legal, technical, and financial 
reforms can result in corruption by local elites who capture power. In order to ensure 
development and poverty alleviation are inclusive, governance reforms that address 
property rights, labor rights, private entrepreneurship, and justice must be transparent and 
fairly administered.78  Thus, as with the application of democracy, a more nuanced 
understanding of and approach to decentralization requires special emphasis on power-
sharing.  
According to Devyani Mani, in what can be described as a growing trend, over 
sixty countries around the world (with populations of more than five million) currently 
engage in some form of governmental decentralization,79 citing a range of reasons related 
to power-sharing mechanisms and corresponding prospects for development, as described 
below:   
• Decentralized governance produces greater accountability through 
transparency of government operations. The presence of multiple levels, 
jurisdictions, and units of government, each with some degree of autonomy, 
ensures that power, authority, and responsibilities are distributed and local 
accountability exists.  
• Decentralization bolsters civil society and increases participation by new 
social groups such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), grassroots 
organizations, business associations, labor unions, and indigenous groups. 
Such civil society actors contribute significantly to the creation of non-
governmental centers of authority and power within a society. As long as 
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these alternate centers of power operate independently of governmental 
control, they are able to hold the central government accountable.  
• Decentralized governance aids in the formation of plural politics. Instead of 
the monopolization of politics by a few large parties, decentralization provides 
opportunities for smaller political opposition parties to play an important role 
within the larger governance system, to participate in elections, and to 
ultimately exercise power and decision-making at the local level.  
• Decentralized governance affords constituents a greater voice in tailoring 
government to suit local needs and to be more responsive. Local government 
officials can be held accountable for success or failure and can be clearly 
identified by the voters on the basis of their responsiveness to their 
constituents.  
• Decentralized governance provides the opportunity for local economic 
initiatives and entrepreneurship. Whereas remote areas of a country can be 
disconnected from a highly centralized governance structure in terms of 
receiving community and economic development assistance, decentralized 
authority and resources will enable greater investment in infrastructure and 
thereby facilitate greater private economic development opportunities.80 
The combination of decentralized governance and the emergence of local civil 
society institutions, while creating pluralism that is fundamental to democratic 
institutional development, also serve to reinforce local cultural identities that reflect 
individuals’, family, clan, and community values.81 
F. CHALLENGES TO DECENTRALIZATION   
Attempts to decentralize have not necessarily been well-received in developing 
democratic countries. Nor have they always been found to be as effective as expected. 
This is because decentralizing governance cannot simply fill a hole in governance where 
it is lacking. The following are some of the drawbacks or limitations of decentralization: 
• The threat of “elite capture” in the absence of adequate policy and institutional 
backing. 
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• The inability of local units to generate adequate funds for providing services 
efficiently.82 
• The potential for economic divisions to widen and reignite existing social 
tensions. 
• The potential for corruption and nepotism to become widespread.83 
Any assessment of the prospects for decentralization must take into account the 
presence of other essential aspects:  an effective security force, a functioning legal 
system, and the presence of some natural resources. Decentralization can have negative 
consequences, but most of its failures can be attributed to ineffective implementation 
rather than a failure of the concept itself.84  Implementation is particularly challenging in 
post-conflict ethnically divided countries where the temptation may be for the 
government to become more authoritarian. A newly decentralized institution can face 
additional implementation challenges when governance proves transitory, weak, or failed. 
A newly instituted system of governance that is substantially more decentralized 
than its predecessor will place greater demands on new fiscal allocations and power-
sharing equations. Society must be committed, in terms of political will, to the new 
system and must be willing to accept the new changes. Decentralization assumes that a 
significant proportion of the population desires more independent and effective 
accountability mechanisms, such as courts, human rights commissions, and other audit 
agencies, that will provide the necessary transparency, checks, and balances. If such 
popular will is absent, or government authorities disregard it, a new decentralized 
structure will likely not succeed. 
Another challenge pertains to a lack of familiarity with the implementation of 
such a structure. A steep learning curve will likely exist, especially in a post-conflict 
society where the state has effectively collapsed. In such situations, there may be no 
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remaining functioning government institutions and few to no remaining leaders with the 
skills to provide interim governance, let alone manage a new and unfamiliar system. Due 
to the enormity of such a challenge, people may oppose decentralization because of a 
perceived conflict between what is required to satisfy short-term needs and the political 
capital required to achieve a more lasting governance solution. Though not optimal, 
international and non-governmental assistance may be necessary to help provide needed 
experience and skills. 
A third challenge reflects the natural inclination to resist and distrust the 
implementation of any new governance structure. Authorities and constituents alike must 
understand and have a minimum level of trust or faith in the new system despite the 
inevitability of initial adjustments and perceptions of failure. The idea of power-sharing 
must be acceptable, or at least given a chance to be fully implemented as designed. Not 
only must the central government be willing to cede powers and authorities to lower 
levels, but those at the lower levels must be willing and able to perform the governance 
functions that devolve to them. 
A fourth implementation challenge concerns the lack of participation by an 
educated and informed electorate. Decentralized governance will never achieve 
legitimacy if the population withholds its participation. A substantial portion of the 
population must possess a minimum level of education and information to understand 
how it can and must be involved in its own governance. This can be a huge challenge for 
people who have never played such a role and who have been accustomed to removing 
themselves from the political arena. Likewise, it can pose a challenge for communities 
that are culturally disinclined towards active participation by ordinary citizens.85 
G. SOCIAL FIT 
 John Bishop and Michael George, in their thesis on “social fit,” identify three 
critical components of social fit:  ideological resonance, expectations regarding the social 
contract, and comfort and familiarity. They argue that ideological resonance is 
determined by the alignment of society’s expectations with those of the government. 
                                                 
85 Saunders, “Options for Decentralizing Power,” 8.  
 37 
Greater comfort or familiarity with the governance structure will essentially produce a 
greater social fit. Greater social fit will also increase the likely stability of a post-conflict 
government.86  Their components of social fit are defined as follows: 
 1. Ideological Resonance  
Ideological resonance refers to the degree to which a government’s view of how 
humans should behave corresponds with the view of the governed. The more closely 
these views align, the greater the ideological resonance. The relative importance of 
various beliefs and values varies from society to society, and these may be driven by the 
historical dominance of a particular religion or some other experience that colors people’s 
view of governance. It is essential for a new government emerging within a post-conflict 
ethnically divided country to understand people’s values and beliefs.  
 2.   Expectations and Social Contract 
The expectations implicit in a social contract, between the government and the 
governed, determine the balance of functions and minimum level of performance deemed 
acceptable by both the government and its constituents. In establishing post-conflict 
governance, it is critical to understand the degree to which the pre-existing social contract 
was breeched and how expectations were not met by one party or the other. 
Understanding the current government’s capacity and citizens’ expectations are keys to 
properly aligning the social contract. The more a post-conflict government is able to 
provide the functions desired by members of society, the greater the likelihood of social 
fit and stability. 
 3.   Comfort and Familiarity 
The degree of comfort and familiarity a country’s population feels towards 
governance is often a matter of the local history and culture. Citizens are less likely to 
participate in a political process that does not incorporate the traditional power structures 
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with which they are most familiar. In a post-conflict ethnically divided country, the 
governing body should seek to avoid a situation where its constituents reject the political 
process and refuse to participate due to a lack of comfort or familiarity, potentially 
leading individuals down a path of resistance or insurgency.87 
H. HOW MUCH TO DECENTRALIZE?  
To begin, it is necessary to recognize that decentralization is not an alternative to 
centralization. Any decentralization process must be able to distinguish and disentangle 
various government functions. Both centralized and decentralized functions and 
authorities are necessary, and their complementary relation should be analyzed and 
modified so as to achieve the overall objective.88  Additionally, the efficacy of different 
approaches should be balanced with the attainment of social fit.   
To guide the process of decentralization, the Management Development and 
Governance Division of UNDP has issued a series of principles. These are as follows`:  
• Not all government functions should be decentralized. It may be more 
advantageous for a government function to remain centralized if the function 
is critical to the achievement of national goals, if its sustainability at the local 
level cannot be guaranteed, if the capacity to perform the function does not 
exist at the lower level, or if decentralization is not cost effective.  
• The degree of decentralization should match the availability of regional and 
local capacities for governance. In post-conflict situations, this includes taking 
into consideration the form of governance prevalent in a society prior to the 
outbreak of conflict and the resulting damage to government institutions after 
the conflict’s termination.  
• Decentralization can be implemented most effectively if the process is 
incremental and iterative. Functions or authorities which may be more 
controversial should be implemented only after political support grows. 
Where vital resources for administration at lower levels of governance are 
lacking, functions and authorities should only be implemented as 
administrative capacity and competence increases. 
• When possible, administrative capacity should be built from the “bottom up” 
without sacrificing significant functionality in the process. While capacity 
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building may require some “top down” assistance, social fit will be better 
achieved through a process that strengthens existing organizations and 
traditional decision-making procedures at the local level. 
• Decentralization of responsibilities should be in accordance with available of 
financial and human resources. To effectively decentralize, the central 
government must be prepared to allocate appropriate financial and human 
capital in the form of technical assistance to the localities. Local levels of 
governance may require significant support in the near term and ideally a 
minimal amount of continued support from the central government.  
• Decentralization may require incentivizing the private sector in certain regions 
of the country as a means to mobilize resources and deliver adequate services 
to lower levels of governance.   
• The decentralization process should involve monitoring and evaluation 
procedures. To assess the impact of decentralization policies on perceptions of 
legitimacy, the process should be broken down into specific and tangible 
measures that can be used as reliable indicators of progress and the 
effectiveness of implementation. The central government should be 
responsible for monitoring and evaluating, and interjecting itself to correct the 
process in a timely fashion should this be necessary.89 
I. A PROPOSAL – THE IDEAL MIX  
Although decentralization aims to achieve equity or at least improve equality of 
opportunity, it is evident that some sort of balance between decentralized and centralized 
authority is necessary. In some countries, inequality has been reinforced over time, and 
some collective entities have been denied equality of opportunity due to the central 
government favoring some groups or individuals over others. Although a strong central 
government can maintain such a situation for some time, especially in the case of a 
submissive or numerically inferior opposition, not all governments can. Where instability 
or inequality have been long-lived, it may be necessary, or at least reasonable, to consider 
some degree of reallocation of resources and power to ensure that decentralization does 
not reproduce skewed local power-sharing, thereby exacerbating conflict-ridden 
conditions.90  Although a country may be particularly vulnerable in the immediate 
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aftermath of an internal conflict, developing governance that incorporates some form of 
decentralized authority may turn out to be less problematic than reallocating resources 
and power.   
In addition to considering the appropriate mix of centralized and decentralized 
authority and the appropriate prerequisites for decentralizing authority, one must also 
recognize that some countries, cultures, regions, and types of services are more suitable 
to decentralization than others. Decentralization is certainly useful and appropriate in 
some circumstances, but it is hardly a desired course of action in others. There is also 
likely a point beyond which smaller units of government will lack the authoritative 
capacity or incentive to engage in decision-making for some activity over which they 
have no control. It is important to acknowledge the limits of decentralization and to 
underscore that the optimal decentralization scheme ultimately depends on the degree of 
social fit that can be achieved.91  In the modern era of nation-building, it is also essential 
that international assistance does not saturate governance institutions, thereby providing a 
false indicator of the viability of decentralized programs and authority, especially during 
recovery and rebuilding stages. 
J. CONCLUSION 
As a means of addressing conflict that emanates from permanent heterogeneity 
within a society, consociational democracy offers an alternative framework to the liberal 
democratic governance framework that has a poor track record in divided countries. By 
handling ethnic diversity via a modicum of autonomy, thorough proportional 
representation, by encouraging coalitions, and by decentralizing governance to diffuse 
tensions and achieve social fit, this thesis proposes that a formerly divided society stands 
a better chance of achieving lasting peace and stability. A decentralized approach to 
governance is more likely to bolster a balanced power-sharing agreement amongst the 
various stakeholders than the centralized approach undertaken recently in various nation-
building efforts abroad. We argue that the long-term stability of ethnically divided 
                                                 
91 Remy Prud’homme, “The Dangers of Decentralization,” World Bank Research Observer vol. 10, 
no. 2 (1995): 201. 
 41 
 
societies is best achieved through apportionment and a balanced of power-sharing 
arrangement. This proposition will be scrutinized in the selected case studies discussed in 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. AFGHANISTAN 
In the aftermath of the 2001 conflict in which the Taliban was driven from power, 
Afghanistan has not achieved a level of stability conducive to post-conflict governance. 
Although we have referred to the period as post-conflict, an insurgency in Afghanistan 
has presented a unique challenge to the government’s ability to stabilize the country. 
While we used the case of Afghanistan, referring to it as a post-conflict country, the 
development of governance in Afghanistan has not taken place in an ideal post-conflict 
environment. Nevertheless, it still exemplifies the situation prevalent in a post-conflict 
ethnically divided society.   
Between 2006 and 2011, only one of the twelve conflict assessment indicators 
analyzed by the Fund for Peace has decreased, namely the massive movement of refugees 
and internally displaced persons, while the indicator measuring intervention by other 
states or external political actors has remained at the top of the scale.92,93  Although 
international efforts to rebuild the country’s governance structure under a new 
constitution have been inhibited by consistent violence aimed at both International 
Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) and those representing the Afghanistan 
government under President Hamid Karzai, our analysis will attempt to sort through the 
ways in which the governance structure does or does not address the country’s ethnic 
fractionalization while taking the continuous state of conflict into account. It is, of course, 
within the realm of possibility that Afghanistan’s enduring instability has little to do with 
the effectiveness, or relative centralization or decentralization, of its system of 
governance. However, our review of history suggests it does.   
In order to understand the degree to which Afghanistan’s current form of 
governance may be responsible for the country’s decreasing stability (according to the 
Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index), or continued instability, more than ten years after 
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the Taliban was driven from power, we will attempt to unravel the factors affecting the 
government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population and whether an alteration in its 
centralization or decentralization would increase this legitimacy. In order to do so, this 
case study will review the framework of Afghanistan’s current Constitution, society’s 
expectations of government, and any historical or current trends that may reveal the 
country’s potential for achieving lasting stability given its ethnically fragmented 
population. 
 1. The 2001 Bonn Accord and Afghanistan Constitution of 2004 
 In January 2004, the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) approved (by referendum) 
Afghanistan’s Constitution, which reflected many of the premises established during the 
2001 Bonn Conference and subsequent agreements reached between Afghan delegations, 
representatives of the UN, and interested governments. Although the Bonn Conference 
produced many noble requirements in addition to an open electoral process and the 
establishment of democratic institutions, such as “a census and voter registration, the 
disbandment of militias, the reintegration of its members into new armed forces, and the 
provision of justice, particularly with regard to war crimes and human rights abuses,” 
their implementation fell short, and the “Bonn conference itself already had substantial 
democratic deficits.”94   
Only four groups—the Tajik, Uzbek, and Shia-dominated Northern Alliance; the 
Peshawar Group sponsored by neighboring Pakistan; the Cyprus Group sponsored by 
Iran; and the Rome group consisting of followers of the former king of Afghanistan, 
Zahir Shah—participated in the conference. Both the Taliban and a delegation 
representing pro-democratic underground and exile groups were excluded. What also 
became apparent is that key Northern Alliance delegates had already chosen and 
confirmed what would become the future Afghan Interim Administration. Despite 
objections by the second-most powerful delegation, the Rome group, that the conference 
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should select an interim leader other than Hamid Karzai, the delegation was “forced to 
repeat the vote under pressure from the U.S. and the UN.”95   
While it is clear that the process for establishing a new Afghan government 
needed to satisfy international actors as well as Afghan leaders and the Afghan people, 
Lakhdar Brahimi (personal representative of the UN Secretary General) and U.S. 
Ambassador James Dobbins, the two prominent architects of the Bonn conference and 
accords, disagreed about whether outside players (e.g. Afghanistan’s neighbors) should 
be included in the process.96  Although they reached a compromise that attempted to 
preserve Afghan autonomy while seeking buy-in from those who would have an interest 
in subverting or undermining the Afghan government, according to Dobbins “Brahimi 
took the lead in moving the Afghans toward our [international community] desired 
goals.”97  Although Dobbins claims that efforts were made to preserve “the essentially 
Afghan nature of the negotiations” as well as ensure “interested governments had an 
opportunity to influence the results,”98 the circulation of a draft interim constitution by 
international envoys during the conference, the insistence on certain democracy and 
human rights clauses by the international community, and the conference’s development 
of a roadmap for Afghanistan’s governance over the course of a mere seven days of 
meetings during the less-than-optimal month of Ramadan99 suggest that the process was 
significantly weighted in terms of the international community’s interests. Although the 
international community and Afghanistan’s neighbors obviously had a stake in the future 
stability of Afghanistan and its governance design, it is questionable whether the history 
of governance or the need for social fit were analyzed and taken into consideration, or 
whether different models of democratic governance were considered for meeting 
Afghanistan’s unique challenges. 
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 To understand the composition and functionality of the central government under 
Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution, there is little need to read much more than the 1964 
constitution. One only needs to substitute the word presidency for monarchy and adjust 
the number of representatives in the national assembly, as well as the number of 
provinces and districts. Under the 1964 constitution, the legislature (Shura) was 
established as a bicameral body with 214 (now 249) delegates in the Wolesi Jirga (lower 
house of the people) and 84 (now 102) delegates in the Meshrano Jirga (upper house of 
elders). Wolesi Jirga members are still directly elected by single-member districts. 
Meshrano Jirga members still divide into thirds:  one third directly elected by the district 
councils; one third appointed by the president (instead of the king) for a five-year period; 
and one third appointed by each provincial council.  
The Wolesi Jirga has primary responsibility for making and ratifying laws as well 
as approving the actions of the president. The Meshrano Jirga does not have legislative 
power, but it does have some veto powers. Other than the requirement that at least sixty-
four women and ten kuchi (nomad) delegates be elected to the Wolesi Jirga and that the 
president appoint at least seventeen women, two disabled or impaired delegates, and two 
kuchis to the Meshrano Jirga, there are no ethnic or tribal mandates codified in the 
constitution. 
Although ethnicity and tribalism have played a significant role when it comes to 
concepts of justice, neither has been a source of significant conflict in terms of the 
election of the national assembly or its legislative functions. However, despite the 
legislative powers of the Wolesi Jirga and the veto powers of the Meshrano Jirga, both 
are largely ineffective due to barriers that restrict political party formation or coalitions in 
parliament,100 resulting in internecine legislative squabbling, and impotence to 
challenging the president’s ability to issue decrees.101  
In addition to issuing legal decrees with minimal legislative input, the president 
maintains war powers, command of the security forces, and the power to appoint high-
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level ministers.102  Despite removing references to the king from the 1964 constitution, 
the 2004 version maintains the “same authoritarian institutional structures” and a “weak 
system of checks and balances.”  Consequently, the balance of power remains skewed 
“heavily in favor of a powerful executive in Kabul, while the reach of government was 
sharply limited for the provinces.”103   
The sub-national government structure under the 2004 constitution has even fewer 
“checks and balances” than it did in 1964. Although contemporary Afghanistan is divided 
into 34 provinces, 398 districts, approximately 217 municipalities, and roughly 40,020 
villages,104 there are technically no local governments if local governments are defined 
as autonomous corporate entities with binding decision-making power and some 
discretion over their financial resources.105  Instead the central government has offices in 
the provinces and districts for the appointed governors and provincial and district-level 
representatives of the country’s “line ministries.”  Governments at sub-national levels 
have little to no control over their elections, levies, assessments, or budgets, and their 
governors and administrations are neither accountable to the people they serve nor have 
strong incentives to effectively serve the people with what few resources and limited 
capacity they do possess.  
The provincial governors, representing the outstretched hands of the central 
government, exercise an ambiguous coordinating and oversight function through the 
ministries, and have primary control over the police and district governors. The district 
governors represent the provincial administration, maintain records of birth, death, and 
marriage, and have coordinating and oversight functions similar to those of the 
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provinces.106  The municipalities, technically under the purview of the Ministry of Urban 
Development and Housing and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance 
(IDLG), are expected to supervise their own budgets and urban planning activities while 
their municipal councils are to be elected.107  However, their revenues, largely generated 
by taxes and user fees, have been insufficient to meet their needs, and the processes for 
receiving support from the central government have been inequitable, inefficient, and 
politicized.108   
Although the Constitution specifies that elections are supposed to take place for 
provincial, district, and municipal councils, elections that were previously to be held in 
March 2011 have since been pushed by electoral officials from 2013 until 2014 due to 
security and financial concerns.109  As a result, the senior provincial and district officials, 
including governors and ministry department heads, continue to be more or less 
appointed by Karzai through a process that lends itself to strengthening his patronage 
network rather than incentivizing a system that rewards merit and ability, or at least holds 
officials accountable in accord with local preferences.110  In total, Karzai “controls more 
than a thousand direct appointments and many more indirectly controlled positions 
countrywide without any parliamentary oversight.”111   
The prominent features of Afghanistan’s government are its extreme 
centralization and lack of accountability to the people it serves. While many have derided 
the central government’s limited command outside of the capital city, the president in fact 
holds the constitutional and legal authorities that make Afghanistan “in theory, fiscally 
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and administratively one of the most centralized countries in the world.”112  The strong 
centralization of authorities naturally takes away from the potential capability of sub-
national governments and their administrations. 
 
































    
Table 4.   Afghan Subnational Government as Mandated by the 2004 
Constitution113 
 Although leaders at sub-national levels of government lack the de facto powers to 
influence financial matters by setting policy or influencing decisions at the center, they 
informally consolidate power through a combination of personal ties to Karzai, tribal 
connections, controlling licit and illicit sources of revenue, and having access to armed 
force.114  The inherent conflict between provincial and district officials, weak formal 
authorities, and the strong informal roles they often play means governance is determined 
by relationships that mirror kinship, tribal, or ethnic ties and often involve other forms of 
patronage. It is easy for the people of Afghanistan who are not privy to the negotiating 
and favoritism that takes place behind closed doors to become skeptical of higher levels 
of government when they see the disparities in financial investment and development 
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across different parts of the country, if not from one district to the next. Thus, while the 
central government’s control over provincial and district leaders through appointments 
and financial apportionment has strengthened ties between the sub-national governments 
and Kabul, the people of Afghanistan have been less inclined to see value in 
Afghanistan’s central government or their respective leaders because of “the manner in 
which [the governors] were elected, poor candidate vetting, and their lack of any 
meaningful role.115   
Since Afghan law treats provinces and districts as single constituencies during 
elections, and the system requires the use of the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) 
method, the law favors candidates who can gather support from a solid bloc of voters in a 
single area rather than appealing to voters in multiple areas (which likely would require 
them to span multiple tribes or ethnicities).116  Consequently, provincial councils, and 
sometimes district councils, are often seen as only representing some groups at the 
expense of others.117  Although this is viewed as corruption by the international 
community, patronage or collective opportunism can be more clearly understood if 
leaders’ roles are seen in relation to their obligations to their families and members of 
their faith, tribe, or ethnic group instead of to the nation as a whole. While it is tempting 
to think that more coercive penalties on corrupt officials would solve the problem, if this 
is Afghans’ default and expected behavior across ethnic groups; it points to a social 
reality best adjudicated through an alternative and more decentralized form of democratic 
governance. 
 2. Afghan Governance and Perceptions of Legitimacy 
 Although the 2001 Bonn Accords and Afghanistan Constitution of 2004 revived a 
centralized system of governance predicated on a constitutional monarchy established by 
the 1964 constitution, it is also worth noting that “the enthusiasm for restoring a highly 
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centralized government was confined to the international community and the Kabul elite 
that ran it.”118  As the International Crisis Group indicates, Afghan history is replete with 
“repeated government failures to conduct comprehensive public consultations on its 
many constitutions,” and its leaders “have failed to include institutional safeguards,” such 
as provisions for a separation of powers across the nine constitutions adopted by various 
regimes since 1923.119   While Afghanistan’s numerous constitutions have produced 
questionable governance since 1978, the relatively weak central government under the 
Musahiban dynasty did keep peace from 1929 to 1978 and never faced an insurgency.120   
In his attempt to discover “how [Afghanistan’s] rulers gained and lost legitimacy, 
and why state power has always been so fragile,” Thomas Barfield notes that in past 
centuries the model of state power and sovereignty left inhabitants in poor or 
geographically marginal areas to fend for themselves as long as they did not present a 
challenge to state authority. Rulers only sought direct control of urban centers and 
productive irrigated agricultural lands, and resorted to tactics well short of direct rule, 
such as denying access to vital markets or punitively using force to intimidate a 
population into acquiescence.121  It was only in the late nineteenth century, beginning 
with Amir Abdur Rahman, that leaders abandoned the traditional model of governance 
for a more exclusive and centralized state.122   
Although governments since the turn of the nineteenth century have used modern 
weapons to effectively suppress and administer geographically marginal regions, the 
people of these regions (often representing minority ethnic factions) “have never fully 
reconciled themselves to this change.”123  Nevertheless, the dissenting populations, to 
include those in largely rural areas, have been provoked to violent opposition only when 
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“Kabul governments [have] attempted to use state power to make radical changes in 
Afghan society.”124  This violent opposition has resulted in state collapse twice in the 
twentieth century in response to modernizing governments:  once during the short 1929 
civil war that ousted the reformist King Amanullah, and then under the Soviet-backed 
government in the 1980s.125   
When comparing these periods of violent opposition with Afghanistan’s half 
century of peace (between 1929 and 1978), the most prominent distinction lies in the 
monarchy having retained legitimacy by restoring public order and occasionally putting 
down a rebellion or two, while also counting on “Islamic religious institutions, local 
economic power brokers, and other states to recognize them as legitimate rulers so as to 
minimize the disruption that would ensue by resisting such claims.”  The Musahiban 
dynasty, while using a degree of force similar to others who sought to govern 
Afghanistan in the twentieth century, typically also employed traditional methods of 
acquiescence to achieve stability rather than relying exclusively on “its ability to project 
coercive power.”126   
Successful Afghan governments have consistently linked their ability to maintain 
public order (as opposed to fitna, meaning disorder, sedition, or civil war), to Islamic 
legal traditions that deem rebellion against an established Muslim ruler by his subjects as 
illegitimate because it creates fitna.127  At the same time, the ethnic tensions that have 
plagued Afghan society “have historically been resolved by traditional structures within a 
feudal system and a local governance structure known as the jirga.”128 When traditional 
authorities could not broker an adequate agreement between competing parties, “external 
elites would often intervene to broker peace or render equitable solutions to grievances,” 
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facilitating stability between tribes and the government.129  Indeed, one of the reasons 
village stability operations (VSO) are said to have achieved credibility is due to the 
program’s aim to re-empower the “traditional village governance structure of Khans, 
Maliks, and Jirgas,” a culturally acceptable governance mechanism.130  By fostering this 
“bottom-up” solution in areas that are often beyond the reach of the central government, 
the people have been able to take control of their own governance while also gaining a 
link to the local district for development and security needs that are beyond their capacity 
as villagers and members of tribes.    
Despite the preference of locals for adjudicating their grievances locally and their 
relative indifference towards most of the policies coming from Kabul, local leaders 
recognize the importance of a central government. All communities in Afghanistan, even 
those most vocal about maintaining their autonomy, have accepted the necessity of a 
central government with higher-level responsibilities that include “preserving internal 
security, protecting the country from hostile neighbors, and negotiating on the nation’s 
behalf for benefits from the larger international community.”131  However, strong 
centralized power in Kabul that encroaches upon the way of life of traditional Afghans 
does provoke a backlash and sets the population against any government in power 
because top-down control fundamentally ignores the ability and desire of the people to 
govern themselves. Resistance to encroachment by Kabul has been particularly strong 
whenever the central government is perceived to be in opposition to a particular 
subgroup’s fundamental values and its understanding of justice given its customary rule 
of law. 
 3. Rule of Law and Islam in the Constitution 
 Through the course of its nation-building efforts, the international community has 
advocated a strong central government in Afghanistan that earns legitimacy by 
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distributing development projects and building strong elements of an Afghan National 
Security Force (ANSF). However, there is significant evidence to suggest that, in 
addition to possessing a reliable safe haven outside of Afghanistan, the Taliban benefits 
from its ability to more effectively provide a system of justice and enforce an acceptable 
rule of law than the central government and its appointed leaders at the province and 
district levels are capable of providing. Due to the international community’s obligation 
to support, for better or for worse, the system of governance it endorsed under the Bonn 
Accords and subsequent 2004 constitution, the “legitimacy of the American [and 
international community’s] presence has become tied to the legitimacy of the Karzai 
government or, at the very least, of the centralized Pashtun-led conception of such a 
government.”132  This poses a significant challenge for the international community 
because the historic reality is that “justice has a particular link to legitimacy in 
Afghanistan” and “the state has been minimalist, in terms of what Afghans expected of 
it.”133   
Meanwhile, the state has not acquitted itself well when it comes to justice. 
According to the First Justice Advisor to the United Kingdom Provincial Reconstruction 
Team (PRT), “Although there is a state system of justice in operation in all provinces, the 
reality is that this is, at best, ramshackle and inefficient, at worst criminally corrupt on a 
huge scale.”134  The International Crisis Group likewise laments, “Afghanistan’s legal 
system is broken… courts are either non-existent or are in disrepair. The majority of 
Afghans view justice institutions as the most corrupt in the country.”135  In other words, 
here, too, in terms of achieving social fit, the creation of a strong central state is contrary 
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to the long-held traditions of the Afghan people, and the state’s top-down governance has 
failed to deliver the minimal expectation they have regarding a system of justice defined 
by Islam. 
 Although the 2001 Bonn Accords simply affirmed that the Constitution will 
“embody the basic principles of Islam,”136 there appears to have been either a failure to 
acknowledge or codify several distinct traditions pertaining to the rule of law. At the time 
Afghanistan’s new constitution was framed, customary law included Pashtunwali (law 
among the Pashtun population), as well as its counterparts in other tribal configurations 
and ethnic groups (e.g. Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara), while above customary law was 
“Islamic law and two of its schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi and Jafari, associated with 
the majority Sunni and the minority Shi’ite populations, respectively).”137  Although the 
various ethnic and religious groups have all invoked sharia law as a legitimizing 
principle, one distinguishing feature over the course of Afghan history has been the role 
of the “ruler’s law” (enforced by the amir in Kabul) and local interpretations of that law 
as pronounced by the ulama and tribal elders outside of the central justice system.138  
Tellingly, while the 1964 constitution is generally considered liberal and the model for 
the present constitution, matters of law remain a conservative preserve. In addition to 
affirming the subsidiary principle (namely, that courts would apply sharia in the absence 
of statutory law), the Constitution also included the repugnancy principle (“no law must 
be repugnant to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam”).139  Most importantly, the 
repugnancy principle “established Islam as the foundational law and positioned the ulama 
as the ultimate authority on the constitutionality of a given code,”140 meaning “the 
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government defines qanun [statutes]” but the local religious authorities “interpret and 
control fiqh [jurisprudence].”141   
Although subsequent modernizers modified the Afghanistan Constitution in 1977, 
1980, 1987, and 1990 to incorporate stronger statutory law and respect for other values 
associated with human rights, the Taliban reversed this perceived secularization of the 
law by de-privatizing religion such that “how and where people worshipped was now a 
matter of public law and state enforcement.”142  While it is clear that the understanding 
of civil versus religious law was more acceptable across Afghanistan’s various ethnicities 
and tribes prior to the Taliban, the consistency with which the Taliban enforced the rule 
of law appears to be preferable to seemingly corrupt, arbitrary, and dysfunctional 
practices today. Indeed, overall, the greatest stability seems to have been achieved during 
periods when local religious authorities were empowered to interpret and control 
jurisprudence. 
 4. Summary of Findings   
 While ISAF continues to build ANSF capabilities and secure the gains that have 
been made in existing governance mechanisms and through post-Taliban development 
projects, it remains unclear which of these will last and how governance might change 
under a new president in 2014. Although we have included Afghanistan as if it is already 
post-conflict, the country remains in a highly contested counter-insurgency struggle 
involving external actors. Its conditions demand a different level of scrutiny than do those 
in countries that have achieved a greater degree of peace. Nevertheless, we can point to 
several sets of takeaways related to the degree of government and its perceived 
legitimacy and stability from the point of view of an ethnically fragmented society. 
• An institutionalized devolution of power to the provinces and districts (instead 
of executive appointments) and greater bottom-up Afghan participation would 
increase segmental autonomy and should lead to increased perceptions of 
government legitimacy which should improve stability.  
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• The Executive branch has been favored over the legislative and judicial 
branches in the current constitution. Subsequently, the president issues 
decrees, appoints key officials, and executes powers with minimal checks and 
balances from the other branches. This has undermined the legitimacy with 
which the Executive branch could operate if the legislature’s proportional 
representation and veto power were strengthened.  
• A central government which acknowledges the limits of its authority and 
empowers sub-national levels of government in areas where it cannot 
adequately reach the people will increase its legitimacy in their eyes. 
• The people of Afghanistan recognize the utility of a central government for 
preserving internal security, protecting the country from hostile neighbors, 
and negotiating on the nation’s behalf for benefits from the larger 
international community, but there is little agreement about whether it can or 
should fulfill other functions exclusively. 
• Local jurisprudence regarding the rule of law should be strengthened and to 
some degree interpretation of Islamic principles at the village or district level 
should be allowed in order to prevent ethnic or tribal dissent and instability 
based on fundamentally different concepts of justice. 
B. INDIA 
Beyond the methodological justifications for India’s inclusion as a case (as 
described in Chapter I), the country’s legacy of democratic governance, in spite of the 
prevalence of tremendous cultural and ethnic diversity, offers a wealth of insights. India 
is one of the most improbable of democracies. In spite of being dangerously divided by 
history, language, religion, and caste, Indian democracy has been able to thrive for seven 
decades.143  As a success story, India can serve as a prognostic example for other 
similarly divided countries that have faced struggles rectifying ethnic identities with a 
concept of nationalism. The analysis to follow will look specifically at key factors related 
to constitutional design, elements of consociationalism, and the degree of decentralization 
as these have been developed in India post-independence. 
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 1. Cultural and Ethnic Diversity of India   
Ethnicities, religions, and languages comprise the major sources of cultural 
diversity in India. The country features three major ethnic groups (as well as numerous 
sub-groups combining ethnicity, religion, language, and caste), twenty-two major 
languages, more than one thousand six hundred dialects, and a population that practices 
all major religions of the world.144  India ranks second (only to Afghanistan) out of the 
twenty-three countries in the region in terms of cultural fractionalization.145  
 While the Indian constitution protects religious freedom for individuals and 
prohibits religious discrimination, the country has witnessed enduring tensions and 
occasional conflict among its various communities, mostly between Hindus and Muslims. 
The caste system in the country has also had a profound effect on the country’s politics. 
Though caste-based political affinities have remained region-specific, they have 
indirectly affected politics at the center with the evolution of coalition governments. 
Surprisingly, none of India’s religious, language, or caste-based tensions has ever 
seriously affected the national fabric. Despite having a few separatist movements, the 
country has remained united and has been able to sustain its democratic institutions since 
its decolonization in 1947.  
 2. Post-colonial Challenges  
In its initial years of independence, India faced many daunting challenges apart 
from being one of the most culturally diverse countries in the world. Some of these 
challenges included dealing with the trauma of religiously based partition and the settling 
of nearly five million refugees from East and West Pakistan, the resolution of territorial 
and political disputes, rejuvenating a largely agrarian economy with a very under- 
 
 
                                                 
144 Library of Congress: Federal Research Division, “Country Profile: India December 2004,” 
accessed on 15 Sep 2012, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/India.pdf.  
145 James D. Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Economic Growth 8 
(2003):  216.  
 59 
developed industrial base, addressing high levels of poverty and unemployment, and 
instituting a democratic system in the absence of literacy, prosperity, and pre-existing 
liberal traditions.146 
After the initial euphoria of being independent, over the next two decades India 
witnessed many states lobbying for greater authority and many ethnic groups requesting 
that state lines be redrawn to reflect the actual language and cultural differences on the 
ground (with some requests continuing even today). Although some sectarian differences 
have resulted in violent clashes, most differences over societal divisions have been settled 
in peaceful democratic ways.147  
 3. The Governance Framework  
India’s constitution, which is one of the longest in the world, establishes a federal 
republic that balances authority between the central government and the states in a very 
unique way. The central government consists of a parliamentary system, with legislative 
powers resting with the lower house of parliament and executive powers vested in the 
prime minister and his cabinet of ministers. The lower house is the house of the people 
and the upper house is the house of states. The division of power is federal with a fair 
degree of authority vested in the states. A similar legislative and executive structure 
exists at the state level. The government also has an independent judiciary and a single 
member district plurality electoral system.148 
The balanced federal nature of India’s constitutional design will be reviewed in 
greater detail in the next section so as to better appreciate its contribution to political 
stability immediately following India’s independence.   
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 4. Constitutional Design  
Constitution framers in India overcame the problem of diversity by including 
many potentially conflicting principles, such as modernity versus traditionalism, state 
intervention in religious affairs versus separation of church and state, liberalism and 
individual rights versus social conservatism.149  Many legal and political scholars credit 
the subjectivity inherent in the Indian constitution with the successful crafting of a multi-
tiered system of values and principles corresponding to the intricate needs of a diverse 
Indian society.150  This aspect of the constitution is clearly visible in the provisions 
concerning the Uniform Civil Code and the official language of the State. By refraining 
from defining the Uniform Civil Code and the official language objectively and 
concretely, the constitution guarantees political and legal debates in the Parliament and 
the Supreme Court.151  Notably, this has been purposely engineered with the aim of 
pushing final decisions to the political arena.152 In other words, the effectiveness of the 
Indian constitution lies in its ability to facilitate, rather than stifle, the politics of 
accommodation of conflicting views. One lesson the Indian case thus offers is that for 
deeply divided societies, the legitimacy and ultimate effectiveness of the constitution 
should be measured by the scope of disagreement that it accommodates rather than the 
depth of the common vision it achieves.153 
 5. Features of Indian Federalism 
In an effort to address cultural and linguistic differences across India, the 
constitution established a federal system with statehood recognized primarily on the basis 
of language and culture. Starting with 14 states and 6 union territories in 1947, the 
country presently consists of 28 states and 7 union territories. The growth in the number 
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of states is a result of a continuous attempt by the central government to accommodate 
the population of a given state and grant autonomy to the different cultural groups located 
within specific regions. Such arbitration of state boundaries is often a response to popular 
democratic demands made by various ethnic and cultural groups. This type of federalism 
has also promoted the creation of culture-based regional parties that have attempted to 
mobilize their respective political bases contending for leadership positions within their 
states to represent their constituencies.154  As the parties have gained political strength, 
they have placed increasing pressure on the central government to relinquish yet more 
political authority to the states. Consequently, over the course of the past four decades, a 
balanced power-sharing structure has evolved that maintains well-defined central and 
state governments with concurrent jurisdictions.155 
 6. Division of Powers between Centre and State 
In addition to distributing territorial authority between the states, the Indian 
Constitution also divides legislative authority between the union (central government) 
and the states according to three lists:  the union list, the state list, and the concurrent list. 
The union list consists of 99 responsibilities or authorities. The Union Parliament (the 
lower house) has the exclusive authority to frame laws on subjects enumerated in the 
union list, to include foreign affairs, defense, the armed forces, communications, posts 
and telegraph, and foreign trade. The state list consists of 61 responsibilities or authorities 
that are exclusive to the states. Only states can make laws regarding public order, the 
police, administration of justice, prisons, local governments, and agriculture. The 
concurrent list, meanwhile, comprises 52 items that include laws regarding criminal and 
civil procedures, marriage and divorce, economic planning, trade unions, electricity, 
newspapers, books, education, population control, and family planning.156  Both the 
parliament and state legislatures can make laws that affect subjects on the concurrent list, 
but in case of conflict between state and union law, the law of the parliament prevails.  
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The parliament can also legislate on subjects from the state list and override state 
laws if the upper house deems a subject of national interest and passes a resolution by a 
two-thirds majority. Examples of parliament overriding state legislation can be found 
during times of emergency (when the democratically elected legislature is suspended), 
when the constitutional machinery in a state fails, or when a state’s legislation impedes 
implementation of international treaties or agreements. Accordingly, the central 
government generally enjoys more extensive powers than the states.   
In terms of administrative powers, the central and state governments each have 
jurisdiction over their respective lists. Although executive powers on the concurrent list 
are generally left to the states, the union government is capable of overriding them in 
national emergencies. Additionally, the central government can issue directives to the 
states to ensure compliance with laws made by the parliament with respect to matters of 
national security, as well as national administrative service, grants-in-aid, and the 
adjudication of interstate disputes. When constitutional machinery fails within a state, the 
union government automatically assumes the executive powers of that state.   
Both the union and state governments have independent sources of revenue and 
taxes that are ultimately tied to their respective responsibilities and authorities as listed. 
Generally, no taxes can be levied on subjects found on the concurrent list. However, the 
central government reserves a large degree of fiscal control over the states and their 
finances by means of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, via its granting 
authority, and during financial emergencies. 
 7. Federalism vs. Regionalism 
Rajni Kothari and Harihar Bhattacharyya, leading political scientists in India, 
view the country’s federalism as a method for accommodating regionalism.157 Indian 
federalism, as a means of achieving political equilibrium, aims for an appropriate balance 
between shared rule and self-rule.158 As a means of achieving this balance, 
Bhattacharyya concludes that federalism and regionalism must be complementary 
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political processes. A multi-tier federation (with powers further decentralized by the 
states or provinces) may be necessary for regional accommodation. Regional 
segmentation may be used to facilitate an ethno-regional distribution, with this form of 
federalism being better able to territorially accommodate ethnically distinct regions than 
others.  
Bhattacharyya attributes India’s success to how it has contextualized federalism 
for its people.159  One of the unique features of India’s federalism is how the federal 
government reconciles regional identity with autonomy. For instance, in order to manage 
political demands for statehood, a region must conclusively demonstrate popular support 
and mobilization. Additionally, authorities at all levels (state, regional, and village) must 
be elected, which is done via universal adult suffrage rather than by unelected 
appointments or some other proportional distribution.160  
 8. Other Stabilizing Features of India’s Governance Framework 
In addition to the uniqueness of India’s system, stability has been achieved 
through other key features of its governance framework that include a politically neutral 
bureaucracy and firm civilian control over the military.161  Given the character of 
political competition and the potential for “winner-take-all” repercussions of elections, 
the existence of an apolitical bureaucracy has prevented blatant favoritism of one group 
or another and ensured a greater degree of legitimacy for the system overall. As a result, 
development projects have been distributed across the states regardless of which 
particular executive happens to be in power. Firm civilian control over the military has 
prevented the military from being abused or used discriminately to quiet dissent or fill 
power voids within the country.   
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 9. Consociationalism in India  
While the impact of these attributes on India’s stability can be considered 
independently, scholars including Lijphart, Kothari, and Crawford Young, have attributed 
India’s stability to its consociational nature.162  It is possible to identify all four tenets of 
consociationalism: a grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportional representation, 
and a mutual veto.   The emergence of India’s coalition cabinets provides evidence of the 
viability of a grand coalition. The accommodation of regionalism by India’s federalist 
system is proof of segmental autonomy, especially when one considers India’s 
accommodation of linguistic, cultural, and religious autonomy under a unified civil code. 
In order to account for proportional representation, India’s central government has 
included parties of consensus within its legislating body and an apportionment of 
reserved seats for specific groups such as scheduled tribes and castes within the 
parliament. Meanwhile, the mutual veto power of Indian minorities has contributed to the 
continued use of English as an administrative language in the southern states, despite the 
use of Hindi as the national language.163  Seen from this perspective, each of the 
principles of consociationalism is embraced by India within its constitution.  
 10. Decentralization of Governance in India  
In his study of the various separatist and secessionist movements in the country 
since independence, Robert Federal has found numerous examples of decentralization 
related to India’s governance. His research has explored the relationship between 
decentralization of various aspects of governance and the stability that results. In general, 
he finds evidence of both fiscal and political decentralization to varying degrees among 
India’s states, resulting in different rates of development and patterns of ethnic strife 
within each state. Although he notes in his case studies of Punjab, the Northeast, and 
Tamil Nadu, that decentralization did not serve as an instigator of violence, there were 
specific instances when decentralization contributed to an escalation of violence. For 
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instance, given the relatively robust local governance structures within Punjab and Tamil 
Nadu, centralization of authority seemed to provoke further resistance efforts. In other 
 
cases, where people were already agitating against authority, such as in Tripura and 
several northeastern states, decentralization served to quell the momentum of violent 
movements. 
Although India has decentralized political governance to a large extent, Federal 
observes that it has undertaken very little fiscal decentralization. The few examples he 
found only mildly correlate with successful poverty alleviation, a factor important to 
stability.164  Overall, Federal’s research indicates that devolving political authority to a 
relatively strong and capable local government has led to greater stability, and though 
India has avoided significant fiscal decentralization, it is likely that legitimacy endures 
due to other governance factors, especially those resulting in a fair and adequate 
distribution of resources and development by the central government.   
 11. Summary of Findings 
           In the aftermath of post-colonial rule, India adopted a system of governance that 
responded directly to the demands of an extremely diverse society. The following have 
been key features of India’s governance framework: 
• The national constitution has left it up to the lower levels of governance to 
deal with a multi-dimensional system of values and principles corresponding 
to the intricate needs of India’s diverse communities. This has resulted in 
debates related to ethnicity, culture, language, and caste being effectively 
thrust into the political arena, further leading to politics of accommodation.  
• A balanced power-sharing federal design has been able to effectively 
amalgamate regional aspirations spurred on by democratically organized 
popular support.  
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• The legitimacy of all political institutions (whether state, regional, or tribal 
council) has been established by electoral victory rather than rigid ethnicity-
driven appointments.  
• A politically neutral bureaucracy and firm civilian control over the military 
have ensured greater continuity of democratic institutions and national 
policies while keeping the military far from the political arena.  
• A balance has been maintained through various political decentralization 
measures that have empowered governance institutions and ensured 
representativeness and inclusivity at lower levels. As a result of balanced 
power-sharing, secessionist and separatist movements have been restricted to 
the regional level without affecting the national fabric. 
• Restricted fiscal decentralization has ensured effective subjugation of 
regionalism and enforced politics of accommodation at and from the center.  
C. RWANDA 
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda represents one of the worst atrocities of the past 
century. Ethnic rivalry between the Hutus and Tutsis (Rwanda’s two major ethnic 
groups) led to a systematic massacre of three-quarters of Rwanda’s Tutsi population and 
the murder of Hutus who opposed the regime.165 Owing to the fact that there are only 
two major competing groups who share the same language, Rwanda features low on the 
ethnic fractionalization list when it comes to the number of ethnic and cultural divides. 
However, mutual distrust, hatred and fear run deep and span generations. Overcoming 
enormous challenges in the wake of the genocide, Rwanda has achieved remarkable 
political stability and economic growth over the last two decades.166 One sees a slow but 
steady improvement in its rank in the failed state index over a span of just five years 
since 2006. We submit that this success is largely attributable to its visionary leader who 
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adopted a contextualized democratic governance framework suited to the needs of the 
country. Considering the fact that Rwanda has been touted as a model post-conflict state, 
analyzing its governance framework is critical to our research.167  
 1. Ethnicity in Rwanda   
 Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa with most Rwandans living 
in rural areas.168 There are three ethnic groups who speak the same language and live 
side by side. The Hutu group is the largest in number, followed by the Tutsis, and finally 
the Twa, who are a small minority group.169 Ethnic rivalry between the Hutus and the 
Tutsis predates independence in 1962.170 The majority Hutu (about 85% of the 
population) came to power after independence and many Tutsis took refuge in 
Uganda.171 For nearly three decades thereafter, frequent ethnic clashes claimed many 
lives in Rwanda. By 1993, after several failed attempts, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) finally forced the government of Rwanda to take it and Tutsis more 
seriously. The international community brokered an agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, 
referred to as the Arusha Peace Accords.172 Unfortunately, the peace accords were not 
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honored and the infamous genocide of 1994 occurred.173 The genocide ended with the 
RPF taking control of Kigali and ousting the Hutu-led government in July 1994.174   
 2. Post-Genocide Challenges.  
 The Government of National Unity listed its priorities as:  restoring peace and 
security; organizing the administration; consolidating national unity; improving the well-
being of the population; resuming the economy; consolidating democracy by combating a 
culture of impunity; guaranteeing freedom of expression and respect for fundamental 
human rights; and promoting political and social pluralism.175 The new Government, led 
by the RPF, made its intentions clear: restoring security was at the top of the list and any 
democratic transition would be attempted only after achieving an environment conducive 
to reform. Other challenges included: 
• The problem of reintegrating a large returnee refugee population, while 
simultaneously delivering justice to the victims of the genocide through a non-
violent process of reconciliation.176 
• Overcoming a legacy in which one ethnic group dominated the other.177 As a 
consequence of the genocide and politization of ethnicity that preceded it, the 
idea of democracy and “majority rule” was extremely troubling to many 
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Rwandans.178 Choosing a suitable governance framework and establishing 
democratic institutions were, therefore, considerable challenges given the 
country’s political history.     
 3. Governance Framework (1994 Onwards) 
Driven by the need to establish peace and security prior to a democratic transition, 
Rwanda established a “consensual dictatorship” in 1994 and since then has gradually 
moved towards a “nominal democracy.”179 Today, Rwanda could be considered a hybrid 
regime, which combines authoritarian and democratic elements.  
 The RPF set up a Transitional Government of National Unity in July 1994, 
sharing power with other parties under the formula agreed to at Arusha in 1993. This 
arrangement, together with a seventy-member multi-party Transitional National 
Assembly, lasted until 2003. During this time government programs concentrated on 
economic reconstruction, justice and community reconciliation, and de-ethnicization.180  
Democracy was introduced with the adoption of a new constitution agreed to by 
public referendum in May 2003. The country adopted a governance framework with the 
following features: 
• Executive.  Chief of state is the President who is elected by popular vote for a 
seven-year term (eligible for a second term). The Prime Minister is the head of 
the government and oversees a council of ministers in the cabinet.  
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• Legislature. The parliament is bicameral and consists of a Senate (twenty-six 
seats; twelve members elected by local councils, eight appointed by the 
president, four appointed by the Political Organizations Forum, two represent 
institutions of higher learning; and all members serve eight-year terms) and 
the Chamber of Deputies (eighty seats; fifty-three members elected by popular 
vote, twenty-four women elected by local bodies, three selected by youth and 
disability organizations, all of whom serve five-year terms). 
• Judiciary. The Judiciary is independent and consists of a Supreme Court, 
High Courts of the Republic, provincial courts, district courts, and mediation 
committees.  
• Political parties.  A multiparty system was reintroduced in 2003. The RPF 
continues to dominate the political space and most of the other parties are 
weak. 181  
 4. Stabilizing Features of Rwanda’s Governance Framework  
 Reflecting Rwanda’s previous unsuccessful flirtation with democracy, central 
features of its post-2003 governance framework focus on national unity, the rule of law, 
inclusiveness, and consensus-building, all of which aim to dissipate ethnic tensions and 
provide security for the country and people.182 These central themes are reflected in how 
democratization is proceeding now that the 2003 Constitution and power-sharing 
mechanisms have been put into place.  
 5. Process of Democratization 
 Driven by the overarching requirement to establish security first and informed by 
well-grounded skepticism about liberal democracy, democratization in Rwanda has been 
incremental and iterative. Starting with a period referred to as “democratic 
consolidation,” Rwanda has moved towards a “nominal democracy.”183  During the 
period of democratic consolidation, the transitional government engaged in a process of 
social engineering which consisted of: 
• Switching from ethnicity-based identity to a national Rwandan identity. 
• Spatial reconfiguration of villages to eradicate ethnic divisions. 
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• Shifting from a subsistence-based farming economy to an agribusiness model 
in an effort to redistribute resources. 
• Configuration of political groupings on the basis of distinctive ideologies 
rather than ethnicity.184  
Human rights activists and political scientists have been critical of this kind of 
social engineering,185 but in our view these actions were necessary for embedding 
democratic values in a society with a bitter conflict-ridden past. The consolidation efforts 
made by Rwanda’s leaders (led by the RPF) appear to have been consciously done to fit a 
unique form of democracy to the peculiar conditions prevalent in Rwanda.  
 6. Constitution, Consociationalism, and Power-Sharing 
 The 2003 Constitution was the result of debates and discussions between various 
parties and ratification via public referendum. It introduced partisan and non-partisan 
pluralism, and codified a consociational model of democracy and power-sharing.186 The 
Constitution is oriented toward equitable power-sharing among the major political parties 
that were signatories to the Arusha Accords and towards establishing a pluralistic 
democratic regime.187 Among other features, it promotes guaranteed representation from 
all spheres of life, elite cooperation, and proportional representation of all political 
parties.  
All registered political parties are required to join the “Forum of Political Parties,” 
where parties meet to discuss government policies and promote consensus. Parties are 
prohibited by law from organizing on an ethnic, regional or religious basis.188 Rwanda 
follows an electoral system that involves proportional distribution of 53 deputy seats among 
closed lists in one national constituency. Individual independent candidates are also allowed to 
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stand for election.189 The Constitution also provides that the President of the Republic and 
the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies shall belong to different political organizations. 
Members of the Cabinet are selected from political parties on the basis of their seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies and a political organization holding the majority of seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies is not allowed to exceed 50% of all members of the Cabinet. The 
Senate similarly reflects of political pluralism and power-sharing. By composition, 
members of the Senate are elected by local councils with at least thirty percent to be 
women and representatives from all geographical regions, entities, and historically 
marginalized communities. The aim is to ensure consociational power-sharing in both the 
legislature and the executive, while clearly staying away from ethnic identities.190 
Although most political parties remain weak and lack capacity, the process of 
decentralization already underway is likely to provide sufficient political capital for them 
to be able to grow and strengthen democracy in the process. 
Since 2000, Rwanda has clearly embarked on a top-driven process of political and 
fiscal decentralization in an effort to promote inclusivity and accountability.191 Yet, the 
politically plural and representative nature of the constitution has had its impacts at the 
grassroots level as well.  
 7. Decentralization 
 Recognizing the importance of connecting democratic governance to citizens at 
the lowest level, Rwanda’s leaders began decentralizing in 2000. People are expected to 
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elect their leaders at the cell, sector, and district levels,192 and when leaders fail to live up 
to the electorate’s expectations, they should be removed.193 The populace is supposed to 
be closely involved in designing tailor-made development plans that then get 
amalgamated into the district development plans, and women, youth, and people with 
disabilities have guaranteed representation in local government structures.194 Although 
decentralization, in and of itself, has yet to make a major impact on development, it has 
nonetheless achieved the primary goal of any democratic framework:  that of connecting 
the people with the government.  
 8. Summary of Findings 
           Recovering from the effects of genocide, Rwanda adopted a unique system of 
democratic governance in a phased manner that was both incremental and iterative. This 
approach has ensured stability and economic development while subsuming ethnicity to 
nationalism. Given ongoing efforts to support decentralization, national elections, land 
reform, and reform of the media, Rwanda is certainly poised to evolve, perhaps 
dramatically, in the coming years. The following are key features of Rwanda’s 
governance framework. 
• The process of reconstruction was led by visionary and resolute leaders of the 
RPF, most notably President Paul Kagame.195  
• Stability was the RPF’s first priority, to be followed by an incremental and 
iterative process of democratization. As stabilization was underway, Rwandan 
society was subjected to a process of social engineering so as to replace ethnic 
with national identity. This was followed by introducing a form of 
democratization that was contextualized to achieve social fit. 
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• The democratic power-sharing model that Kagame (and his regime) chose 
makes use of consociational principles (e.g., guaranteed representation and 
proportional representation).196  
• Political decentralization was undertaken to connect the population to the 
government. This process, while still nascent, is expected to be followed by 
limited fiscal decentralization.  
D. KENYA 
 During the 59 days following its 2007 general elections, Kenya experienced the 
worst political crisis since it received independence in 1963. Violence left 1,500 dead, 
3,000 innocent women raped, and 300,000 people internally displaced.197  Consequently, 
it is not surprising that Kenya’s overall stability has not recovered, but has instead 
decreased from 2006198 to 2011.199 Indeed, conflict assessment scores for ethnic 
indicators, vengeance seeking grievances, criminalization or de-legitimization of the 
state, and the rise of factionalized elites all show substantial increases. Of the twelve 
conflict assessment indicators (cited p. 8), only two—demographic pressures and human 
flight or brain drain—have seen a modest improvement between 2006 and 2011.200  In 
terms of ethnic and cultural fractionalization, Kenya ranks eleventh and fifteenth 
respectively in the world.201   
All these statistics point to an extremely volatile situation which requires a more 
nuanced understanding of the historic development of Kenya’s system of governance. 
However, we ask just how legitimate it was prior to the general election crisis. Also 
important are the constitutional actions that have been implemented since the crisis to 
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attempt to regain stability. Although some claim that the violence surprised both Kenya 
and the international community because of the country’s democratic successes after the 
2002 election,202 other analyses indicate that the violence was not only predictable but 
that it could have been prevented.203  We will attempt to address this discrepancy by 
determining whether the violence was an aberration or consistent with the mounting 
discontent of various factions within Kenya’s ethnically diverse population. We will then 
review the consociational trends in Kenya before and after the post-election violence, and 
conclude by specifying some of the conditions under which decentralization might be 
undertaken to produce greater long-term stability. 
 1. Kenya’s Ethnic Diversity 
 According to Kenya’s most recent census, there are three large ethnic 
communities:  the Kamba, Kikuyu, and Luo. There are many ethnic minorities and, given 
political developments since independence, it is also important to take into account the 
Luhya and Kalenjin204 tribes as well. Political parties have typically aligned along tribal 
lines, with ethnicity valued over political ideology or policy.205 
 Another important way in which Kenya’s ethnic groups segment is into three 
main ethno-linguistic groups:  Bantu, Cushitic, and Nilotic.206  Different languages not 
only underscore some of the ethnic differences, but they also coincide with where 
different groups live and how they gain their livelihoods. People’s allegiances also 
depend on whether they live on the plains, highlands, river, near Lake Victoria, or in 
coastal areas.207   
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Although Kenya has been classified as a country with no fewer than 42 tribes, the 
government has discontinued providing an ethnic breakdown of its population after the 
population and housing census of 1999 due to a misuse of the data.208  Nevertheless, it 
seems likely that any system of governance that fails to adequately address Kenya’s 
ethnic diversity would be riven by with perpetual instability, and a central government 
would be unlikely to successfully adjudicate the different groups’ grievances and 
interests from Nairobi. 
 2. Social Exclusion and Ethnic Conflicts 
 In order to determine the degree of social fit between Kenya’s system of 
governance and the population at the time of the 2007 general election, it is necessary to 
first review perceptions about the government’s legitimacy. Again, perhaps the post-
election violence was the result of long-time social exclusion and ethnic conflict, or 
perhaps it represents an aberration.   
The fact that Kenya has escaped descending into full-blown civil war, never 
experienced a successful coup d’etat, and has no history of ethnic cleansing helps explain 
why it has generally been regarded as a relatively stable country and has attracted better 
investments than comparable countries in the region. Kenya is home to the headquarters 
of major international agencies, to include UN Africa, UNEP, and UN-Habitat. 
Additionally, its government has been a key player in peace negotiations and conferences 
held to address conflict in Sudan and Somalia, while assisting hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from both countries.209   
As of 2006, these positive signs suggested a country whose governance structure 
seemed able to manage its ethnic fractionalization as well or better than others over the 
same period of time.210  Therefore, in spite of its history of corruption, human rights 
abuses, and substantial poverty (of more than half of its citizens), if one simply assessed 
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Kenya on the basis of its relative stability, one would probably overlook the ways in 
which the government had cultivated social exclusion and ethnic divisions leading to the 
2007 post-election violence. 
 As Maurice Makoloo suggests, the “non-fulfillment of basic human needs—needs 
of autonomy, group (ethnic) identity, participation, recognition, security, and, of course, 
poverty” have been building over time.211  For instance, discrimination and ethnic 
animosity were apparent in the first ten years of Kenya’s independence, vividly seen in 
the sharp contrast between number and quality of schools and education facilities, health 
services, modern roads, piped water and delivery of electricity to be found in Kikuyu 
versus Luo areas.212  Despite attempts by Oginga Odinga, a prominent Luo politician, to 
gain greater representation for his people by forming the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) 
party to challenge the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, his 
mysterious death and the ensuing “Kisumu Massacre”213 resulted in the banning of the 
KPU and the return of Kenya to a single party state.214  Although Jomo Kenyatta is 
credited with holding Kenya together and avoiding civil war and total chaos, he was also 
largely responsible for implanting ethnicity “as the dominant basis for political 
mobility.”215   
Following the peaceful transition from Kenyatta to his Vice President, Daniel arap 
Moi, a member of the Kalenjin tribe, inequalities in funding, distribution of land, 
infrastructure, and other resources continued, with elites from the Kalenjin tribes now 
receiving the favors. An attempted coup d’etat was crushed by Moi loyalists in 1982, 
leading to Moi’s entrenchment and continued use of tribal politics throughout the 1980s, 
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to include the detention and exile of prominent leaders from the previous regime.216  It 
was only in the wake of substantial pressure by foreign trading partners and donor 
agencies that Moi allowed the Constitution to be amended in 1991, leading to the re-
emergence of political parties.  
However, multiple parties were engineered to favor Moi, who also incited ethnic 
tensions to justify eliminating opposition groups wherever they gained strength. Despite 
losing credibility after his riot police shot and killed protesters on July 7, 1990, Moi again 
unleashed violence in 1991 resulting in nearly 2,000 killed and tens of thousands 
displaced in the western part of Kenya. By inciting violence and using the 
aforementioned tactics, Moi was able to attain re-election by a slim margin in the 1997 
elections, and was finally constitutionally prohibited from running only in 2002.217 
As the 2002 elections approached, the government has “completely eliminated 
ethnicity from the legislature, aggregated statistics instead on the basis of gender and age, 
and occasionally based on province or rural versus urban.”218  The general election in 
2002 signified a changing of the guard that many thought would finally bring a “system 
of governance that would have accountability through shared power.”219  A new alliance 
of political parties formed which accounted for all of the major Kenyan tribes. This 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) soundly defeated the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU), which had been Kenya’s ruling party since independence.  
Mwai Kibaki, formerly vice president under Moi, won the presidential election by 
forging a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the tribal factions within 
NARC to alter the constitution within 100 days, limit the power of the executive, and 
reverse years of oppression, corruption, and hurtful economic and social policies.220  
Although Kibaki did introduce measures to liberalize the media, implemented primary 
education and street-child rehabilitation programs, and installed an anti-corruption 
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commission,221 trust in him eroded as the MOU’s promises related to government 
positions for key partners went unfulfilled.222  As a result, in November 2005, Kibaki’s 
proposed constitution was rejected, and it would be another five years before a new one 
would be proposed.  
Despite the opportunity granted him to restructure Kenya’s system of governance 
with more decentralized power-sharing, once elected Kibaki attempted to organize elite 
power-sharing only within the executive branch. This undermined his government’s 
legitimacy. Consequently, Kibaki’s main challenger in the 2007 elections, Raila Odinga 
and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), promised to return to a federal system 
(majimbo223). They rejected Kibaki’s centrally controlled devolution of authorities.224  
Thus, although the violence that resulted after the rigged 2007 elections has been tied 
both to unemployed youth who had been barred from protesting the election results and 
unresolved land disputes between Kalenjins and their Kikuyu neighbors,225 the violence 
has also been emblematic of a popular desire to minimize ethnic favoritism by returning a 
certain degree of power-sharing from the executive to a more local level. 
 3. Consociationalism and Devolution of Governance in Kenya 
 Although Kenya was classified as a “special and somewhat limited version” of a 
consociational democracy, even before the introduction of a multi-party system in 1992, 
226 its governance is better described as a “hegemonic exchange” rather than a power-
sharing institution.227  In theory, while the central government and its cabinet consist of a 
grand coalition of representatives from the various ethnic groups, and representation 
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extends to the district level, segmental autonomy is absent. Proportional representation 
has been achieved through “plurality elections in single-member districts that follow 
settlement patterns of the geographically concentrated ethnic groups.”228  Additionally, 
allocation of finances and public sector jobs roughly follow the proportionality of the 
elected representatives, but there is no formal mutual veto. Therefore, while ethnic and 
other traditional social factors seem to affect the apportionment of administrative 
boundaries, the central government and its executive have been entrusted to maintain a 
legitimate balance of power between the major ethnic tribes vying for representation.  
Although this system of proportional representation emphasizes elites as the 
segments responsible for representing the interests of their constituents, the link between 
key ethnic leaders as cabinet members and their ethnic groups has been dubious at 
best.229  In reality, even after the introduction of a multi-party system, “the presence of 
intra-party competition at the local level contribute[d] little to ethnic proportionality in 
parliament, and even less to ethnic balance in the cabinet.”230  Despite an attempt by 
leaders to create the perception of proportional representation, the unbalanced authorities 
in the executive branch and the glaring absence of segmental autonomy have inevitably 
enabled corruption by individuals in the central government and favoritism towards some 
ethnicities and tribes over others. 
 Although Kibaki pledged to devolve powers downward and dilute the powers of 
the presidency, he rejected a March 2004 draft of the constitution that proposed “dividing 
the nation into regions, districts, divisions and locations, with (directly/indirectly) elected 
governments at each level” as well as “defining the President as the head of the state and 
the Prime Minister as the head of the government.”231  According to a 2005 Minority 
Rights Groups International (MGRI) report, for instance, nine districts received 44% of 
the nation’s total funds for development, while the remaining fifty districts shared the 
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other 56%.232  Such differences in resource allocation exacerbated ethno-regional 
inequalities and have caused Kenya to be listed as one of the ten most unequal countries 
in the world, and among the top five in Africa.233  In the wake of the 2007 political crisis, 
the extent of ethnic divisions and the need for constitutional reform became even more 
apparent. 
 In the aftermath of the post-election violence and with the assistance of UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, both the opposition party (ODM) and Kibaki’s Party of 
National Union (PNU) signed the Kenya National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 
2008. Acknowledging the erosion of public trust and confidence, the agreement signaled 
an attempt to resolve the situation by creating trust among the elites first, followed by the 
citizens, and in particular between the warring communities—the Kikuyu and the 
Kalenjin.234  However, the two parties were unable to agree on some of the protocols 
surrounding the proposed structural changes to the executive which was to be comprised 
of an executive President and Vice President, an executive Prime Minister and two 
deputies, and a Cabinet appointed from elected members of the Parliament.235   As a 
result, the diminution of both presidential and central government powers, and provisions 
for a substantive devolved government, were not approved until a 2010 referendum on 
the constitution.   
The August 27, 2010 Constitution grants Parliament up to five years to enact 
general legislation and create institutional structures necessary for implementing the 
constitution in its entirety. Kenya’s Parliament has already enacted legislation dealing 
with the devolution of governance that is aimed to achieve the following objectives 
(outlined in Article 174 of the constitution): 
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• Promoting democratic and accountable exercise of power; 
• Fostering national unity amidst diversity; 
• Enabling self-governance of the people towards their interrogation of the 
State; 
• Recognizing the right of communities to self-management and development; 
• Protecting and promoting the rights and interests of minorities and 
marginalized groups; 
• Promoting socio-economic development; 
• Ensuring equitable sharing of national and local resources; 
• Rationalizing further decentralization of State organs; and 
• Enhancing checks and balances.236 
Beyond these stated objectives, the 2010 Constitution attempts to redress failures 
associated with Kenya’s previous experiences with local government by establishing 47 
county governments with clearly defined structures, mandates, and rights granting people 
greater control over how they and their resources are governed.237  In addition to 
functions previously delivered by local authorities, the county governments now manage 
local health services and agricultural extension and livestock services, while the national 
government still retains authorities for primary and secondary education.238  While a lack 
of some devolved authorities and functions may appear to de-legitimize local 
government, an iterative process of devolution may yet provide greater long-term 
legitimacy and stability by ensuring that lower levels of governance have the resources 
and capabilities to effectively manage particular functions as they are assigned. 
Ultimately, however, the constitutional changes must also coincide with increased public 
participation in local decision-making; constituents need to understand the importance of 
their role in micro-level issues of governance. 
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 4. Summary of Findings 
Kenya is trending toward instability if one compares the Conflict Indices between 
2006 and 2011. This is a direct reflection of the political violence following the 2007 
general election. Overall our analysis reveals that the following characteristics have 
resulted in greater instability since Kenya’s independence: 
• Unbalanced power, lack of accountability, and lack of transparency of the 
executive branch. 
• Election fraud and lack of legitimacy even with a pluralist presidential 
election. 
• Absent or poorly constructed segmental autonomy of local and regional 
governments. 
• The grand coalition in central government did not fairly represent all local 
ethnicities or tribes. 
• Unequal distribution of economic development, job creation, and land 
apportionment by the central government.  
 Although the legitimacy and stability of Kenya’s system of governance has 
suffered setbacks as a result of the post-election crisis and the externally-driven peace 
and constitutional reform process, the ongoing implementation of the 2010 Constitution 
signals that Kenya is on the right track toward a legitimate government and more 
stabilized society. The following propositions either reflect provisions in the 2010 
Constitution or thematic reforms that would further stabilize the Kenyan government in 
the years to come:  
• The electoral framework should reflect proportional representation and 
minimize the power of an executive that does not represent the majority of the 
population. The Judiciary branch should be empowered to arbitrate and certify 
election processes and results. 
• The balance of power must shift from the executive to include the legislative 
and judicial branches. 
• Each coalition party must represent a minimum number of different ethnicities 
and it must exist for a minimum period of time before promoting candidates. 
• Ethnicity and group identity concerns should be gradually delegated by the 
central government to local authorities. 
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• An iterative process of devolving power to local governments and their 
constituents as they become capable of handling the functions should be 
implemented. 
• Civil society and economic stakeholders must be involved in the negotiations 
about institutional reforms and economic policy, land acquisition, and job-
creating programs. 
• The central bank should be more independent of the executive branch to 
reduce the influence of electoral politics on macro-economic decisions. 
• All Kenyans should have access to census data, as well as to how funds are 
allocated and services distributed down to the smallest level. 
E. LEBANON 
 Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has frequently been subjected to the 
tensions emanating from multiple regional fault lines that include Sunni/Shi’a, 
Arab/Iranian, Arab/Israel, Christian/Muslim, and Western/Islamic differences.239 Given 
deep underlying fissures in Lebanese society, Lebanon adopted the consociational model 
of democracy and has retained it to the present day. However, Lebanon’s 
consociationalism was not able to prevent the 15-year-long civil war (1975–1990), or 
domestic political instability and continued external interference in domestic politics.240 
The country has undergone consistent deterioration according to the stability ranking in 
the Failed State Index since 2006.241 Lebanon is, therefore, a deviant case for the success 
of consociational democracy in deeply divided societies. After a brief analysis, of 
Lebanon’s diversity and its political history since independence, we will examine the 
reasons for the failure of its consociational framework.  
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 1. Cultural and Ethnic Diversity in Lebanon 
 In the tumultuous history of the Middle East, Lebanon represents a unique 
coalescence of Muslim and Christian communities and of Western and Islamic 
influences. Presently, most Lebanese are Arab, with nearly 60% Muslim (55% Shi’a and 
45% Sunni), almost 39% Christian (Maronites), and a sprinkling of Druze (who are 
mostly Muslim).242 These three principal religious communities can be further broken 
down into 18 recognized religious sub-sects. The proportions among these groups and 
sects, and the associated political influence that they have sought to exert, have been 
constantly changing due to varying social conditions among them over time. Lebanon’s 
demography has also been affected by a large influx of Palestinian refugees since 1948. 
These refugees are mostly Sunni Muslims (Sunnis account for nearly 90% of the 350,000 
Palestinians in Lebanon). Despite opposition from resident Maronites and Lebanese 
Muslims, a large number of these Palestinians were granted citizenship in 1992 under 
Syrian pressure.243 This further exacerbated the already unstable divisions in society. In 
Lebanon, religion is more than a belief system; it is a major determinant of individual and 
family identity, with people only remotely connected to an overarching national 
identity.244        
 2. Evolution of the Governance Framework  
 One might say that sectarian divisions made consociational democracy a logical if 
not the only choice for Lebanon.245 The consociational model was first embodied in the 
1926 Constitution when Lebanon was still a French colony. Key features of this 
Constitution included ensuring freedom for all religious communities and proportional 
representation to ensure power-sharing among them, albeit in a provisional manner.246  
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On gaining independence in 1943, a National Pact was signed by Christian Maronite and 
Muslim leaders. This pact was honored until 1975. The following key features reflect the 
consociational nature of Lebanese power-sharing at the time: 
• There exists an oral agreement about the distribution of top posts, wherein the 
president was to be a Maronite, chosen by parliamentary vote for a single six-
year term. In a non-binding consultation with the parliamentary deputies, the 
President would nominate a Sunni Muslim as prime minister. The prime 
minister was to form a cabinet with a proportional representation of Christians 
and Muslims (50% Christians and 50% Muslims/Druze). The speakership of 
the Chamber of Deputies went to a Shi’a and his deputy was to be an orthodox 
Christian. The same principle of proportional representation applied to 
Ministerial portfolios, and all major appointments in the executive, legislature, 
and judicial branches. In the armed forces, the army commander was to be a 
Maronite with the other service chiefs to come from other religions.247  
• Parliamentary seats in the legislature (Chamber of Deputies) were distributed 
in the ratio of six to five favoring the Christian majority. Deputies came from 
geographical districts and each district had a specified number of seats 
allocated on the basis of religion.248 
• Veto power existed for all communities due to the requirement that there be a 
two-thirds majority vote on issues related to power-sharing and changes to the 
governance structure.249 
This power-sharing formula endured until 1975. The framework broke down 
under sectarian pressure resulting from demographic shifts, with the growth in the 
Muslim population, among the Shi’a in particular, combined with the intrusion of broader 
Middle Eastern politics.250  
The civil war ended with the Taif Accords of 1989, provisions of which were 
formally incorporated into the constitution in 1990. Changes included a readjustment of 
the power-sharing formula among the two main religious groups from a six to five ratio 
to equal parliamentary representation; fundamental issues that required a two thirds 
majority vote were elaborately specified; the powers of the president were curtailed, 
while those of the prime minister, the council of ministers, and the speaker of the house 
                                                 
247 Harris, “Republic of Lebanon,” 246. 
248 Harris, “Republic of Lebanon,” 246. 
249 Makdisi, Kiwan and Marktanner, “Lebanon,” 131. 
250 Makdisi, Kiwan and Marktanner, “Lebanon,” 131. 
 87 
were strengthened; and religious quotas for administrative appointments were abolished 
except for some senior positions. While most of the provisions introduced by the Taif 
Accords have been implemented, many important ones still have not received sufficient 
attention. These include steps to eliminate confessionalism (distributing political and 
institutional power proportionally among religious communities) and the introduction of 
administrative decentralization.251 Although Lebanon continues to have consociational 
democracy, the country has remained politically fragile, under constant tension from 
sectarian agendas and external influences.  
 3. Reasons for Instability 
 While acknowledging the fact that, in theory, consociationalism may have been a 
suitable model for a country like Lebanon, many studies have found fault with how it has 
been applied. Consequently, instability is said to exist for the following reasons:  
a. Rigidity of the Confessional Power-Sharing Arrangement  
 The rigid confessional power-sharing arrangement that was adopted has 
not been able to accommodate changes in the broader environment.252  In 1943, a slight 
advantage was given to the Christian groups, in particular the Maronites, over the Muslim 
components of the Lebanese society, based on the fact that a population census conducted 
in 1932 recorded a slight majority of Christians. However, Christians have had a low 
birthrate and higher emigration than Shi’a Muslims, resulting in a radical shift in the 
demographic balance over the decades. This demographic reality did not correspond with 
a suitable change in the power-sharing formula which has assumed a fixed ratio of 
Muslims to Christians since 1943. Consequently, Christians continued to enjoy 
disproportionately greater power in comparison to the Muslim majority, a fact that has 
repeatedly destabilized the nation. The Taif Accords altered the power-sharing 
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arrangements to meet post-conflict needs in 1989, but the government’s confessional 
nature has remained the same. 
b. Confessionalism and External Interventions  
 Elite power-sharing based on confessionalism (also called corporate 
consociationalism) has led to sectarian-based power-sharing arrangements that are not 
only hard to adapt to a rapidly changing national environment, but inhibit formation of a 
national identity.253 Sectarian elites are constantly subject to regional interventionism 
born of broader regional conflicts and enmities. The influx of Palestinian refugees and 
Syrian hegemonic interference for nearly 30 years has further exacerbated this situation. 
Unfortunately, one of the unimplemented provisions of the Taif Accords is the 
establishment of institutional structures to eliminate confessionalism. 
c. Over-Centralization of Power  
 Prior to the Taif Accords, the President was bestowed with overwhelming 
powers that included the ability to dissolve the cabinet. This was rectified to a large 
extent by shifting power away from the president to a cabinet equally divided between 
Christians and Muslims. However, the accords failed to deal effectively with the rigidity 
of proportionality within the system, particularly as the Christians have sought to hold 
onto power, and the Muslims have sought to gain more power.254  
d. Lack of Administrative Decentralization  
 Lebanon is highly centralized administratively, which permits the 
sectarian political elite at the center to dole our preferential treatment to individual 
communities. Identifying this as a factor that prevented the formation of cross-cutting 
cleavages, the Taif Accords called for administrative decentralization. Unfortunately, this 
remains unimplemented to date.  
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 Salamey, in his prescriptive analysis of Lebanese consociationalism, suggests that 
the way to evolve integrative consociationalism is to introduce bicameralism, a suitable 
electoral system to encourage formation of secular parties, and administrative 
decentralization. He argues that these reforms can preserve sectarian communal interests 
while, at the same time, accommodating permanently changing communities and 
respecting individual citizenship. The integrative consociational option is likely to 
moderate the appeal of sectarianism in favor of cross-cutting cleavages resulting in 
national cohesion and political integration.255 Development and economic upliftment 
driven by decentralized administrative institutions are also likely to encourage formation 
of multi-religious groups at the grassroots level. This would further reduce the tensions 
arising out of sectarian power-sharing and   reduce incentives for the elite to be 
influenced by external powers.256 
 4. Conclusion  
 Lebanon presently faces the fundamental challenge of strengthening domestic 
political stability and promoting equitable socio-economic growth while shielding itself 
from destabilizing external influences.257 Political stability is likely to be achieved by 
eliminating confessionalism in a systematic manner and promoting decentralized 
governance that would ultimately lead to the formation of cross-cutting non-sectarian 
cleavages. 
F. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 Following the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the 
ensuing civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 marked another chapter in a 
long history of ethnic conflict in the Balkan region. Not dissimilar from conflicts in the 
other five semiautonomous republics of the former Yugoslavia, the atrocities and 
instability in Bosnia resulted from the heterogeneous nature of a society that includes 
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three distinct ethnicities and their corresponding religions:  Muslim Bosniacs, Roman 
Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Christian Serbs.258  In November 1995, after persistent 
international pressure, the warring groups met in Dayton, Ohio to initiate a peace 
settlement brokered by the United States, Germany, France, Britain, and Russia.  
In some ways, the weight of diplomatic pressure that molded the outcome of the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (GFAP), otherwise 
known as the Dayton Accords, set a precedent for the role diplomatic pressure would 
play in the 2001 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan’s future. Although the two 
conferences ended with drastically different governance structures, in both instances the 
interests of the international community at-large outweighed the value of achieving 
consensus and social fit consistent with local history and culture. For instance, rather than 
emerging from the Dayton agreement with an acceptable plan for a legitimate post-
conflict government to move towards long-term future stability, the Serbs, Croats, and 
Bosniacs all either denied that they had signed the agreement or claimed that they had 
been coerced into signing it without agreeing to its provisions.259  Although the Dayton 
Peace Accords, along with the presence of United Nations peacekeeping troops, 
effectively ended the violence between the parties, the complexity and ambiguity of the 
agreement has resulted in a system of democratic governance featuring political stalemate 
and institutionalized ethnic tensions. 
 1. Stability after the Dayton Accords  
 Given the fact that Bosnia is the third most ethnically fractionalized country in 
Eastern Europe and among the most fractionalized in the world (outside of Africa),260 
and considering the nature of the civil war that preceded the Dayton Accords, Bosnia’s 
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improved stability between 2006261 and 2011262 is a remarkable success. However, while 
two of the stability indices associated with ethnic fractionalization have decreased 
(signaling an increase in stability), the index associated with a “rise of factionalized 
elites” has increased sharply (signaling a decrease in stability). This mixed message is, in 
part, a consequence of the role external actors played in managing the post-conflict 
power-sharing agreement. Instead of brokering an agreement that would facilitate cross-
cutting ties between ethnicities, “the EU (through its various representatives) directly 
deconstructed the institutions of the state it aimed to develop” by “supporting the method 
of political decision-making in which the leading party officials, as ethnic leaders and not 
as heads of institutions, played the major role.”263  The European Commission itself 
reports that ethnicity is one of the main forces behind obstructing access to social 
protection, health care, and schooling, regardless of citizens’ ethnic, religious, or racial 
background.264  Thus, while group grievances may not reflect previous levels of ethnic 
tension, the potential for conflict persists due to political frictions among factionalized 
elites. The resulting inefficiency affects the provision of basic services to the population.   
Although the obstacles to effective economic development and provision of social 
services can affect various groups’ perceptions of equality and, ultimately, of a 
government’s legitimacy, most of the concerns have to do with the intricate and 
complicated set of constitutional arrangements that encourage greater divisions in 
society. Since the proportional elections held for the lower (people’s) house in 1996, 
leaders have resorted to mobilizing support by emphasizing “radical sectarian appeals” 
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and “electors [have] cast ballots strictly along ethnic lines.”265  Additionally, studies have 
indicated that, despite the successful return of “as many as one million refugees and 
displaced persons” to their prewar homes, even with 390,000 returning to places 
controlled by an ethnic group other than their own,266 population shifts after the Dayton 
Accords led to fewer multiethnic communities.267  Consequently, some believe the EU 
prefers a social and political arrangement that creates strong ethno-political leaders 
“capable of delivering a political outcome conducive to wider principles of regional (or 
even continental) stability” rather than “bringing the country closer to final 
integration.”268   
While a short-term focus on establishing a consensus between ethno-political 
elites may have been a necessary first step for the peace building process in the 
immediate aftermath of civil war, the accentuation of societal divisions via a fixed 
constitutional arrangement could well jeopardize more long-term and integrative stability. 
 2. Consociationalism and Power-Sharing in Bosnia’s Constitution 
 The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
“special-type consociational state” or an “asymmetrical confederation” composed of two 
entities:  the unitary Republika Srpska (The Republic of Srpska or RS) and the 
multiethnic Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).269  Each possesses all of the 
typical functions of a complex state:  “territory, population, citizenship, constitution, 
parliament, government, judiciary, administrative system, military, police, official 
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languages, flag, coat of arms, anthem, and so on.”  Meanwhile, the central state 
institutions are limited to controlling “foreign policy and trade, customs, monetary and 
migration policies, air-traffic control, the implementation of international obligations and 
regulations, [and] the regulation of transport between the entities.”270   
At the state level, the Parliamentary Assembly is composed of two chambers:  the 
House of Representatives with membership reflecting entity proportionality and the 
House of Peoples following the principle of entity and ethnic parity. Meanwhile, the 
national government, called the Council of Ministers, has a membership based on entity 
proportionality with the Chair appointed by the three-member State Presidency. Thus, a 
grand coalition government is formed, “consisting of the parties of all three national 
segments.”271  In addition to proportional representation in the executive and legislative 
branches, even the Human Rights Court and each federal court must have an equal 
number of judges representing each ethnicity according to parity.272  In other words, 
proportionality and parity are used to meet the proportional representation principle both 
between entities and across ethnicities.  
Finally, a mutual veto power belongs to the President of each of the three 
predominant ethnic groups who may “declare a [legislative] decision to be destructive of 
a vital interest of the entity” which he or she represents. If such a claim is made, the 
Presidency Decision will not take effect if it is overruled by a two-thirds vote in the 
National Assembly of the Republika Srpska or in the federal House of the Peoples.273  
Due to the degree to which this consociational system effectively implements an ethnic 
democracy, laborious consensus-building often becomes a rudimentary part of legislation 
at all levels. 
Due to its largely monoethnic composition, the RS’s power is highly centralized. 
In contrast, the FBiH consists of ten cantons which “have their own constitutions, 
parliaments, governments, administration, courts, police forces, and so on.”274  Of the ten 
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cantons, five have Bosniac majorities, three have Bosnian Croat majorities, and two 
(Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva) have demographically mixed populations. 
Consequently, with a requirement of support from at least one-third of each group to pass 
legislation through the House of Representatives, there have been plenty of obstacles to 
enacting laws at the canton level in the FBiH in contrast to the RS. As a result of this 
discrepancy, a 2002 Constitutional Court ruling “mandated the representation of the three 
groups at all levels of government” and facilitated greater representation of Serbs in the 
FBiH and Croats and Bosniacs in the RS.275  What we find, then, is that the 
consociational principle of segmental autonomy has been constitutionalized at the state 
level in the form of the two entities and at the federal level in the form of the cantons, 
with an attempt also being made to artificially infuse proportional representation 
throughout both entities in order to essentially legitimize the rigid ethnic quotas that the 
constitution requires.  
 While the Bosnian constitution is consociational in nature, its institutionalized 
power-sharing arrangement adds debilitating complexity and rigid ethnic quotas that 
place it closer to an ethnic democracy than a consociational one. Essentially, post-Dayton 
Bosnia consists of “one state, two entities, three peoples, four million citizens, and five 
layers of governance led by 14 prime ministers and governments.”276   
In addition to having a state with the world’s highest combined number of 
presidents, prime ministers, and Cabinet ministers, the central government is excessively 
decentralized, to the point where it initially consisted of only eight ministries and is still 
dependent on the two entities for budgetary transfers.277  As if this complexity were not 
enough, achieving conformity across these multiple levels can be stifled by the 
internationally appointed Office of the High Representative (OHR) which is responsible 
for supervising implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords.  
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In 1997, not long after the accords were adopted, the OHR was granted the power 
to confirm or deny public appointments, impose legislation, and remove public officials 
considered obstructionists to progress.278  Although the OHR, funded by a Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) representing some fifty-five countries and international 
organizations,279 might have initially been intended to serve as a referee for the laborious 
process of implementing Bosnia’s complex constitution,280 its powers have not subsided, 
and it has become a hindrance to Bosnia’s continued progress. For example, stern 
“warnings” by the OHR about necessary constitutional changes have resulted in 
economic, social, and political consequences for Bosnia, particularly as a result of 
constitutional flaws revealed in the 2009 Sejdic-Finci case.281  This is so despite rare 
overwhelming political consensus among Bosnian elites to join the EU.282   
While it is clear that Bosnia seems to be “reaching the limits of its Dayton 
constitution,” withdrawing Bosnia’s nomination to the EU on account of constitutional 
flaws that require a substantial overhaul could “be the first in many steps backwards.”283  
Accession into the EU may, in fact, present the ideal impetus to form multiethnic cross-
cutting ties and achieve constitutional reforms that have been neglected in the seventeen 
years since the Dayton Accords.   
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 3. A Consociational Democracy in Transition? 
 Although the Bosnian constitution under the Dayton Accords has effectively 
institutionalized peace at the expense of political and economic growth, there is reason to 
believe that constitutional reforms can be made to achieve the right social fit to ensure the 
long-term stability of such an ethnically divided society. In 2005, the international 
community (primarily the U.S.) initiated a debate about constitutional reforms and 
applied some political pressure on domestic political actors. As a result, they created 
three major ethnic parties (SDA, HDZ, and SDS) and four smaller parties (SDP, SNSD, 
HNZ, and PDP), and in March 2006 began a two-stage reform of the constitution, 
referred to as the “American plan.”284   
While maintaining characteristics of proportional representation and a mutual 
veto at the entity and canton levels, the reforms attempted to shift the balance of power 
towards the central government “by increasing the powers of the Parliamentary Assembly 
and the Council of Ministers, and to a certain extent by the changes in the manner of 
electing those bodies and the decision-making processes in them.”285  Although the 
ensuing “April Package”286attempted to replace the three-member presidency with a 
weak indirectly elected president while transferring most executive powers to a strong 
prime minister, abolishing the House of Peoples, and transferring its functions to the 
House of Representatives, the ambitious attempt fell short of passage by two votes at the 
last minute “due to opposition from the splinter Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 
1990) and Bosniac hardliners in the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH, Stranka za 
Bosnu I Hercegovinu).”287   
As the near passage of the American plan demonstrated, no matter how noble it 
was in theory, those seeking to pass it failed to acknowledge the need to secure its 
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legitimacy through a more bottom-up process that would decentralize certain aspects of 
governance. Nevertheless, the attempt at constitutional reform through an iterative 
process appears to be the best method for transitioning the country away from rigid and 
inefficient ethnic democracy to a more viable consociational model in the long run. 
 In terms of economic development, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s recovery from war has 
been aided by more post-conflict international assistance per capita than we see in any 
other case.288  Yet, despite the surge of international capital and an overall positive 
macroeconomic picture, “pre-war levels of per capita output have not been achieved.”289  
Whereas international efforts have sought to stimulate economic growth anchored in 
fiscal and price stability, this top-down (macroeconomic) approach has produced socially 
polarizing growth rather than laid the foundations for more equitable development that 
would benefit the population as a whole.290  Rebuilding Bosnia’s economy primarily 
through the central government and a large central bank, while consistent with overall 
international governance objectives, has failed to address repercussions at the local level.  
In their case study, Zupcevic and Causevic acknowledge that the “economy is not 
immune to the post-conflict ethnic divisions” and conclude that the six primary barriers 
to improved national competitiveness and faster economic development remain 
“inefficient administration, political instability, corruption, government instability, tax 
burden, and organized crime and theft.”291  The barriers to economic development 
suggest that the solution should involve more rather than less local control. However, the 
ultimate problem remains the “public perception of inequality as resulting from the type 
of growth, which has primarily benefited the elites, has reinforced the sense of 
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disillusionment and also disengagement with the political process, including reducing 
participation in elections.”292   
 As an alternative to externally imposed and top-down governance reform, others 
advocate for microfinance as the means to build longer-term cross-cutting ties within 
society. In fact, some describe Bosnia-Herzegovina as a “best-case scenario for testing 
the impact of microfinance initiatives” due to its post-conflict situation that includes a 
highly educated work force, a lack of capital for business start-ups, and weak political 
and economic institutions.293  They point to two local initiative projects (LIP I and II) 
that successfully “influenced the entrepreneurial poor, strengthened the micro-credit 
organizations’ (MCO) capacity for providing high-quality credit services to their clients, 
and had helped ‘create or sustain more than 200,000 jobs in nearly 100,000 micro-
businesses’”294  Although it is hard to assess whether the overall microfinance experience 
has achieved broader social goals, such as integration, reconciliation, and inclusion, it has 
been considered successful as a “building block toward rebuilding a small- and medium-
scale financial system,”295 particularly given the limited resources involved, and 
especially in contrast with the large-scale initiatives coming from the central government. 
 4. Summary of Findings 
 The trend in Bosnia and Herzegovina toward increased overall stability and 
relative improvement of its economic position296 seems to reveal a country that has 
successfully moved beyond its violent civil war and the tenuous post-conflict conditions 
settled by the Dayton Accords. However, it is unclear whether the existing governance 
framework, with such active international involvement, has established the conditions for 
long-term stability or has only achieved an internationally imposed and artificially 
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contrived armistice between the ethnic factions. The rigid institutionalization of an ethnic 
democracy, while adhering to consociational principles, has restricted the development of 
cross-cutting ties that ultimately produce the type of long-term stability that is optimal for 
a country’s growth and well-being. While this strict formulation based on ethnic quotas 
may have been the only acceptable solution to end the conflict, Bosnia has made few 
alterations to its constitution in the seventeen years since signing the Dayton Accords. 
Despite a large-scale investment by the international community in Bosnia’s economic 
development, the country’s ability to be self-sufficient is questionable, and its accession 
into the European Union, a step that is desired by all parties, depends on significant 
constitutional reforms that are far from being realized. From the perspective of how to 
best move forward, Bosnia faces the same three potential options that it did at the time of 
the Dayton Accords: 
• Division into three separate homogenous national states—the Bosniac, the 
Croatian, and the Serbian—with the Croatian and Serbian states immediately 
joining Croatia and Serbia. 
• Amalgamation of the divided society into an undivided one through the 
assimilation of one or several segments. 
• Acceptance of the divided society and establishment of a consociational 
democracy.297 
 Due to frustration with the implementation of the third option and the inability to 
conceive of the second option, some may believe that social fit necessitates adopting the 
first option.298  While this may have the greatest likelihood of success, and so it should 
not be casually dismissed, there are indications that Bosnia could achieve social fit by 
pursuing a less stringent version of consociational democracy that allows the devolution 
of some powers that are currently retained at the central government or entity level to the 
canton or municipal level. With this in mind, we believe adopting the following measures 
would lead to a greater likelihood of enhanced legitimacy and long-term stability for 
Bosnia: 
• To move beyond the rigid constitutionalization of ethnicity, the Bosniac, 
Croatian, and Serbian elites must negotiate an iterative approach towards de-
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ethnicizing the central government by decentralizing divisive aspects of 
decision-making over time. 
• International oversight must be gradually withdrawn from Bosnia in order to 
allow political leaders to achieve legitimate governance solutions for the 
people. 
• Constitutional reforms must be promoted with greater transparency; the aim 
should be to reduce complexity; and people must be able to directly elect their 
representatives rather indirectly elect representatives or select representatives 
from a particular ethnicity only. 
• Territorial federalism, that does not depend on ethnic quotas or require 
artificial construction of mixed ethnicity in neighborhoods, needs to be 
strengthened for the sake of parity and proportionality. 
• The central government’s authority over the entities or states needs to be 
reduced even while the center retains a leader capable of a strong foreign 
policy and effective control over the military. 
• Croats must be offered the means to influence state policy akin to that of 
Bosniacs and Serbs. 
•  A settlement needs to be negotiated that will allow Bosnia to enter the EU 
conditioned upon it taking certain steps toward constitutional reform. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
What does establishing democracy mean?  Although an international consensus in 
favor of democratic (as opposed to authoritarian) governments has existed since the Cold 
War, the United States and the international community at-large have maintained a spotty 
track record when it comes to actually establishing functioning and stable democratic 
institutions. While some of the failures can be attributed to a lack of adequate resources 
or insufficient time invested in implementation, the recent case of Afghanistan highlights 
the poignant reality that context matters.   
Beyond the dilemma posed by Afghanistan, we have ventured to discover the 
necessary conditions under which governance in post-conflict ethnically divided 
countries can bring about stability. Although a number of factors have been attributed to 
a country’s conflict (instability) index score,299 our research has attempted to validate the 
tenets of consociational democracy and the notion that decentralization of governance is 
imperative in countries that are plagued by debilitating ethnic fractionalization. 
Specifically, we have proposed the following for such countries: 
• When structures of governance account for existing ethnic diversity through 
autonomy, proportional representation, and a suitable coalition, stability is more 
likely since it will be bolstered via a balanced power-sharing agreement amongst 
the various stakeholders. 
• By the same token, a centralized approach to the governance construct is 
likely to be less successful than a decentralized, “bottom-up” approach in 
ensuring enduring stability. 
After reviewing six countries and how their governments have addressed inherent 
ethnic fractionalization, we can distinguish among them on the basis of:  how cross-
cutting ties were formed between the various divergent groups during the reconciliation 
process; the relative rigidity or flexibility of the constitutions towards institutionalizing 
ethnicity; the degree of proportional representation (PR) achieved; the extent of 
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segmental autonomy involved in their power-sharing arrangements; and  according to the 
degree and nature of decentralization that occurred. 
In the immediate aftermath of conflict and, in some cases, throughout a country’s 
history, the reconciliation of inter-group grievances must be addressed. The duration and 
extent of the reconciliation process varies greatly from one country to another and 
depends not only on the degree of ethnic fractionalization, but the disparity between the 
competing ideas of the groups involved. In our analysis, we have found that some of the 
mechanisms which emphasized elite cooperation to secure cessation of the conflict 
succeeded in achieving short-term stability. However, long-term stability ultimately 
requires that cross-cutting cleavages in society be fostered by development of political 
parties or other groups that span sectarian divisions.   
In Lebanon, for instance, elite power-sharing based on confessionalism has led to 
sectarian-based arrangements that have been unable to adapt to a rapidly changing 
national environment and have continuously inhibited the formation of a national 
identity. In the wake of its civil war, Bosnia employed a similar system with elite 
representatives of three ethnicities involved in the power-sharing arrangement to diffuse 
authorities and tensions. Although Bosnia’s stability improved during the same period 
when Lebanon’s declined, Bosnia’s stability has also come at the cost of stifling 
movement towards a national identity. This situation can be described as one in which 
“purported solutions to ethnic conflict that take pre-democratic identities as fixed, such as 
partition, ethno-federalism, ethnic power-sharing, and the granting of group rights, may 
needlessly lock in mutually exclusive, inimical national identities.”300   
At the other end of the consociational spectrum—in Rwanda—the RPF 
engineered elite cooperation by nominating a Hutu President in the initial years following 
the conflict. This was consciously done as part of the process of reconciliation and as a 
first step towards stabilization. In India, elite cooperation was facilitated by the 
nationalist spirit that emerged from the independence movement. However, long-term 
stability in both cases relied on deliberate constitutional design which ensured the 
                                                 
300 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York, 
NY:  W.W. Norton, 2000), 36.  
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formation of cross-cutting cleavages. What both cases suggest is the importance of 
avoiding institutionalizing a system of ethnic or ethno-religious quotas that only enhance 
societal divisions and inhibit economic development and necessary legislation. Instead, it 
makes sense to adopt a power-sharing agreement that ensures power alternates between 
groups (to avoid an entrenched status quo), or ensures groups evolve that do not have 
strict ethnic or religious identity. Both methods foster opportunities to form cross-cutting 
ties and thereby secure stability.   
In addition to addressing group grievances and protecting groups from one 
another so as to prevent future conflict, the right constitutional design can play a pivotal 
role in accommodating diversity. While the constitution will directly impact power-
sharing arrangements following conflict, it cannot become too tied to the divisive 
identities that it hopes to subsume over time. Although it is important to recognize that 
diversity is a foundational premise of consociational democracy, no constitution should 
aim to institutionalize diversity in a way that impedes consensus-building.   
In India and Rwanda, constitution framers overcame the problem of diversity by 
including elements of subjectivity and abstention to deal with deep divisions in society. 
In India, this has left the lower levels of governance to deal with a multi-dimensional 
system of values and principles corresponding to the manifold needs of a diverse society. 
Debates related to ethnicity, culture, language, and caste were effectively thrust into the 
political arena, leading to politics of accommodation. Consequently, the legitimacy of 
political institutions, at every level, has been secured by electoral victory rather than 
through rigid ethnicity-driven appointments.   
In Rwanda, the constitution is based on equitable power-sharing and governance 
by a pluralist democratic regime. All registered political parties are prohibited by law 
from organizing on an ethnic, regional, or religious basis. The constitution provides for 
legislative elections based on proportional representation, and it also ensures that the 
President of the Republic and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies shall belong to 
different political organizations (and not ethnic groups). We see a similar attempt to 
construct political parties that cut across ethnic or tribal affiliations in Kenya. However, 
in the case of Kenya, strong executive powers and a strong central government have 
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enabled elected figures to divorce themselves from the parties that nominated them, or 
divide the spoils with other elites within the central government.   
At the more problematic end of the spectrum, Lebanon and Bosnia have 
constitutions committed to rigid power-sharing quotas between ethno-religious (Lebanon) 
or ethnic (Bosnia) groups, and the Human Rights Court has even gone so far as to 
regionalize diversity in otherwise homogenous areas (e.g. Bosnia’s RS) to legitimize its 
contrived power-sharing arrangement. While such an artificial constitutional construct 
might appease groups in the short-term, it is ill-equipped to handle a dynamically 
changing population (which is Lebanon’s challenge with confessionalism) or to further a 
transition beyond ethnicity (which remains a problem for Bosnia).    
To achieve sufficient proportional representation, representatives in a bicameral 
parliamentary system should be chosen based on a suitable electoral system. Bicameral 
representation enables group representation in the upper house and geographic 
representation in the lower house. The parliamentary system (as opposed to the 
presidential system) is apt to “increase the degree of freedom that facilitates the 
momentous tasks of economic and social restructuring facing new democracies as they 
simultaneously attempt to consolidate their democratic institutions.”301   
We attribute the failure of the Lebanese consociational model to its plurality list-
based system that encourages confessional elites to trade power with other elites across 
sectarian lines without soliciting votes from their respective social groups, thus 
discouraging cross-cutting cleavages. A similar occurrence can be seen in Afghanistan 
and Kenya where tribal leaders can make conciliatory pacts to achieve plurality outcomes 
that leave a majority of the population in heterogeneous districts (or regions) excluded 
from a legitimate PR outcome. Although the electoral systems in Afghanistan and Kenya 
both provide some form of geography-based PR in their legislatures, their strong 
presidential systems dictate the de facto political representation of the constituencies.   
                                                 
301 Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, “Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative 
Perspective,” in The Failure of Presidential Democracy, eds. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela 
(Baltimore, MD:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994):  120.  
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In contrast, India, Rwanda, and Bosnia all have different versions of a bicameral 
parliamentary system and use a combination of the PR and pluralist electoral systems. In 
India, which is a pure parliamentary system, the lower house is elected by a pluralist 
method using the SNTV, while the upper house is elected using the PR system. Rwanda 
adopted a combination of the presidential and parliamentary systems in which the 
members of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate are elected or appointed using the PR 
system. Meanwhile, members of Rwanda’s Cabinet are selected based on PR according 
to political affiliations, with the number of Cabinet positions held by any one political 
organization to not exceed fifty percent. The President of the Republic, however, is 
elected by a pluralist vote.   
In Bosnia, a rigid quota system of entity and ethnicity proportionality consumes 
the two houses of the parliament (legislative branch), the Council of Ministers (national 
government), and the Human Rights and Federal Courts (judicial branch). The influence 
of the three national segments even extends to the three-member State Presidency. While 
a pluralist system has been incorporated to some degree in all three countries for 
simplicity and ease of understanding among the electorate, the PR system in each country 
ensures the necessary representativeness.   
Although India, Rwanda, and Bosnia have all attempted to move beyond PR 
based on ethnicity, India and Rwanda have achieved greater political unity across the 
different ethnicities than has Bosnia due to the differences in their constitutions. While 
Rwanda and Bosnia have instituted a mixed parliamentary and presidential system, India 
has instituted a purely parliamentary system. However, in contrast to Lebanon, Kenya, 
and Afghanistan, the aforementioned countries have achieved considerably more PR 
through a weakened executive branch that allows a greater degree of consensus-building. 
Another constitutional feature which distinguishes the countries’ governance 
structures is their accommodation of segmental autonomy while maintaining a national 
identity. India has adopted a flexible federal design that has been able to effectively 
accommodate its different region’s aspirations. In order to facilitate peoples’ desire for 
more homogeneity at the local level, India’s Constitution allows people to revise 
segmental boundaries and add autonomous states with the approval of the central 
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government. India also empowers local governance and ensures inclusivity of all groups 
at lower levels within the states. This approach to segmental autonomy has consequently 
kept secessionist and separatist movements at the regional level, without affecting the 
national fabric.   
India also provides a model for accommodating differences that are not regionally 
aligned and where territorial autonomy is not feasible. Respect for linguistic, cultural, and 
religious autonomy has been facilitated through a constitutional design that mandates 
personal and family laws (as determined by the religion, caste, etc.) be codified by an act 
of the parliament. India’s many communally-specific and family laws, however, are 
superseded by a uniform civil code that is prescribed by the Constitution.   
Like India, Bosnia has decentralized numerous governmental functions that are 
often reserved for national governments. It has thereby allowed ethnic and religious 
groups at both the entity and canton levels to determine laws consistent with their groups’ 
values. However, Bosnia has done so, in many cases, at the expense of maintaining a 
strong national identity.   
Rwanda’s approach is quite different from both of these. Rather than constructing 
segmental autonomy according to ethnic or some other group identity, the Rwandan 
Constitution has resorted to de-ethnicizing society. No communal identities are politically 
recognized. Instead, members of society are able to achieve representation through close 
interactions with empowered leaders at the cell, sector, and district levels.   
The system for accommodating segmental autonomy in India offers a sharp 
contrast to the weak or absent segmental autonomy in Afghanistan, Kenya, and Lebanon. 
Despite facing cultural fragmentation comparable to India’s, Afghanistan’s highly 
centralized system of governance maintains significant authority over the provinces and 
districts. Although jurisprudence was effectively decentralized by previous Afghan 
regimes to achieve a social fit, there has been little consideration of what such an 
alternative judicial system could achieve today, and so government continues to be 
deemed illegitimate by many Afghans of different ethnicities.   
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While Kenya has attempted to de-ethnicize governance, in ways similar to 
Rwanda, it is only since the 2010 constitutional referendum that it has achieved 
significant segmental autonomy through substantial devolution of authorities to the 47 
county governments. In Lebanon, meanwhile, segmental autonomy is largely restricted 
by rigid adherence to confessionalism, even at the district level. This yields a power-
sharing construct that offers little cross-cutting mobility.    
We also see distinctions among our six countries when we compare their efforts 
to devolve authorities to local levels of government. In order for local levels of 
government to have the autonomy to make decisions that reflect the values and interests 
of the people it represents, the central government must divest authorities to the lowest 
possible level so as to achieve the optimal social fit and prevent discrimination in favor of 
one group to the detriment of another.   
Typically this works if the process is incremental or iterative in nature. In India, 
the formation of states and empowerment of local governance bodies (through the 
panchayat raj system) occurred incrementally while allowing for different states to 
develop at their own pace across the country. While many of India’s governmental 
functions have been decentralized, the center does retain considerable fiscal authority. 
This enables it to sublimate disruptive regionalism and to enforce politics of consensus.   
In Rwanda, democratic governance was similarly introduced in stages after a 
period of social engineering designed to de-ethnicize society. The decentralization of 
various government functions has also increased trust in the national government, thereby 
enhancing its legitimacy. In both India and Rwanda, the process of democratic 
decentralization has helped stabilize the political environment, while involvement by 
local levels of governance in economic development has encouraged the formation of 
cross-cutting ties at the grassroots level.   
Unfortunately, although Bosnia’s governance is significantly decentralized, the 
Dayton Accords instantly led to segregation as a means to mitigate strong ethnic tensions. 
The country and international community have since been involved in a slow process of 
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trying to shift Bosnia from a highly decentralized and bureaucratically inefficient state of 
governance to a more efficient system that entails greater amalgamation among ethnic 
groups. 
In contrast to the three countries with increasing stability, Lebanon, Kenya, and 
Afghanistan have all resisted democratic decentralization for various reasons. As a result 
of highly centralized authority in Lebanon, the sectarian political elite retain excessive 
power which they use to dole out preferential treatment to individual communities, 
largely preventing the formation of cross-cutting ties.   Although the Taif Accords called 
for administrative decentralization, their implementation has been ineffective to date due 
to the acute resistance by the political elite.   
Kenya’s strong central government, while considered one of the most corrupt in 
the world, had managed to successfully avoid significant ethnic conflict for more than 
four decades until the 2007 political crisis. However, it appears that Kibaki’s efforts to 
retain a strong executive and central government are now in decline due to significant 
efforts to devolve the central government’s authorities and capabilities to the county 
governments which have been strengthened in accordance with the 2010 constitutional 
referendum. The upcoming general election in December 2012 will ideally reveal that the 
trend of democratic decentralization is continuing as the candidates appeal to voters who 
want a more representative government.  
Since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, efforts to create a highly centralized 
government in Afghanistan have mostly resulted from inattentive methods of the 
international community at-large that overlook Afghanistan’s governance during periods 
of relative stability. Although informal efforts to decentralize and contextualize 
governance (e.g., via the VSO program) have achieved some success and increased the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) legitimacy at the village 
level, the resources invested in VSO pale in comparison to those that continue to be spent 
to support the Karzai-led central government.   
More than ten years after establishing a foundation for governance built on 
democratic principles, progress towards stability in Afghanistan is inconsistent at best 
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and, at worst, is hopelessly elusive to many who have been bitterly frustrated by what 
some experts claim is an imposition of an unwanted democratic system.302  While the 
fast-approaching artificial deadline for troop withdrawal in 2014 has heightened the 
pressure to provide a more feasible near-term governance solution, necessity can 
sometimes be the mother of invention. It would certainly be problematic to propose an 
alternative form of governance that splits the country into regions if that alternative were 
to result in a chaotic and untenable situation for GIRoA. Also, if one assumes that the 
“empowerment of what we have started calling ‘local (or regional) power brokers’ and 
what was known as ‘warlords,’” during the period between 1992 and 1996, inevitably 
leads to the rise of potentially hostile groups, such as the Taliban,303 it would be 
blasphemy to even think of advocating decentralization or power-sharing between the 
central and lower levels of government. However, the idea of divesting some of the 
central government’s authorities to sub-national entities to diffuse tensions between rival 
groups (such as in the realm of jurisprudence), while retaining sufficient military and 
diplomatic strength at the center to perform what many Afghans regard as the legitimate 
functions of the central government, may present a stronger social fit than other proposals 
to date. 
****************************** 
In the process of analyzing the governance frameworks of six ethnically divided 
countries that have experienced conflict, we have been able to validate our two starting 
propositions to varying degrees. While each country has attempted to achieve stability 
through a variety of constitutional features and methods of governance, some 
characteristics of governance have been more successful than others in helping to achieve 
lasting stability versus recurring instability. Although all of the countries we examined 
acknowledge the importance of achieving some degree of legitimacy as perceived by 
their diverse constituencies, they differ in how they use governance to achieve 
legitimacy.   
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What we have learned is that the prescription of democratic governance, in and of 
itself, is insufficient for making a government legitimate in the eyes of those who belong 
to deeply divided societies where no inherent appetite for national unity exists. However, 
some countries where stability is increasing have proven able to contextualize 
governance in a way that achieves a social fit with their populations’ distinct identities. 
Others have not been able to do so.   
Our findings suggest that steadfast adherence to consociational democracy tenets 
and tailored decentralization of governance functions are key to achieving social fit in 
highly divisive countries, such as the post-conflict ethnically divided countries we have 
studied. Although the involvement of external actors, economic factors, and other 
geopolitical considerations can delay stability or serve as a catalyst for instability, if 
governance is designed to take social fit into account, it is far likelier that the system of 




Abou El Fadl, Khaled M., Said Arjomand, Nathan Brown, Jerrold Green, Donald 
Horowitz, Michael Rich, Barnett Rubin, and Birol Yesilada. Democracy and 
Islam in the New Constitution of Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA:  RAND 
Corporation, 2003. 
Ayub, Fatima, Anotonella Deledda, and Patricia Gossman. Vetting Lessons for the 2009–
10 Elections in Afghanistan. January 2009. Accessed October 24, 2012. 
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5261~v~Vetting_Lessons_f
or_the_2009–10_Elections_in_Afghanistan.pdf. 
Bardhan, Pranab. “Decentralization of Governance Reform in Developing Countries.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no.4 (2002):  185–202. 
Barfield, Thomas.  “Afghan Paradoxes.”  In Afghan Endgames, edited by Hy Rothstein 
and John Arquilla, 39–57. Washington, DC:  Georgetown University Press, 2012.  
Barfield, Thomas and Neamatollah Nojumi.  “Bringing More Effective Governance to 
Afghanistan:  10 Pathways to Stability,” Middle East Policy 17, no. 4 (2010):  40–
52. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif and Daniel Rothenburg, An Assessment of Justice Sector and Rule 
of Law Reform in Afghanistan and the Need for a Comprehensive Plan. July 2–3, 
2007. Accessed October 31, 2012. 
http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/ihrli/pdf/rome_conference.pdf.  
Belloni, Robert and Shelly Deane.  “From Belfast to Bosnia:  Piecemeal Peacemaking 
and the Role of Institutional Learning,” Civil Wars 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2005):  219–
243. 
Berg-Schlosser, Dirk.  “Elements of Consociational Democracy in Kenya.”  European 
Journal of Political Research 13 (1985):  95–109. 
Bhattacharyya, Harihar. “Federalism and Regionalism in India: Institutional Strategies 
and Political Accommodation of Identity.” In Heidelberg Papers in South Asian 
and Comparative Politics, edited by Subrata K. Mitra. Accessed on 20 Sep 2012. 
http://hpsacp.uni-hd.de/. 
Biljert, Martineyvan. Between Discipline and Discretion:  Policies Surrounding Senior 




Bishop, John D. and Michael J. George.  “Governing in Post-Conflict Society:  Social 
Fit.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 
Binningsbo, Helga Malmin. “Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will 
Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace after Civil 
War?” January 7, 2005. Accessed on March 5, 2012. 
http://home.aubg.bg/students/DNH110/AUBG%20Classes/Spring%202012/Resea
rch%20Methods/Readings/Logit_regression_example.pdf.   
Blunt, Peter and Mark Turner. “Poverty Reduction in Asia Pacific.” Decentralizing 
Governance. Edited by G Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2007.  
Boex, Jamie and Roy Kelly.  “Fiscal Decentralization in Kenya:  A Small Step or Giant 
Leap?” IDG Policy Brief. May 2011. Accessed October 21, 2012. 
http://www.urban.org/publications/412332.html.  
Bogaards, Matthijs.  “Power-sharing Parties:  Representation and Accommodation inside 
Dominant Parties.”  Presentation, Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political 
Science Association, Vancouver, Canada, 4–6 June 2008. 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna.  “Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina:  Reflections on the 
Development-Democracy Link.”  In New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding. 
Edited by Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, 201–217. New 
York, NY:  United Nations University, 2009. 
Brady, Brian and Jonathan Owen.  “Controversial Plan to Split-up Afghanistan.”  The  




Burnet, Jennie E. “Rwanda,” Countries at the Crossroads. Freedom House 07. Accessed 
on 26 Sep 2012. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrpage=37&
ccrcountry=167.  
Carter, Stephen and Kate Clark. No Shortcut to Stability:  Justice, Politics, and 
Insurgency in Afghanistan.   London, UK:  Chatham House, 2010. 
Center for European Integrative Studies.  “An Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Last 




Cheema, G Shabbir and Dennis A. Rondinelli.” From Government Decentralization to 
Decentralized Governance.”Decentralizing Governance. Edited by G Shabbir 
Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 
2007. 
Cookman, Colin and Caroline Wadhams. Governance in Afghanistan:  Looking Ahead to 
What We Leave Behind. May 2010. Accessed October 24, 2012. 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/05/pdf/afghangovernance.pdf.  
———. “Country Profile:  Rwanda.” Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Govt of UK. 
Accessed on 27 Sep 2012. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-
abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/sub-saharan-
africa/rwanda/?profile=politics. 
———. “Country Profile: India December 2004.” Library of Congress: Federal Research 
Division. Accessed on 15 Sep 2012. 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/India.pdf. 
Dagne, Ted. CRS Report for Congress. Rwanda: Background and Current Developments, 
01 June 2011. 
Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD:  Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
Dobbins, James F., et al. America’s Role in Nation-Building:  From Germany to Iraq. 
Santa Monica, CA:  RAND Corporation, 2005. 
Dobbins, James F. After the Taliban:  Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC:  
Potomac Books Inc., 2008). 
Doyle, Michael. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983):  205–235. 
Etling, Bruce. Legal Authorities in the Afghan Legal System (1964–1979). Accessed 
October 31, 2012.  http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/etling.pdf.  
———. “Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan.” June 8, 2011. Accessed on 
March 5, 2012, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SPRT%20112–
21.pdf.  
———. European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Equal Opportunities. Social Protection and Social Inclusion in Bosnia and 




Ewans, Martin. Conflict in Afghanistan:  Studies in Asymmetric Warfare. London, UK:  
Routledge, 2005.  
Fearon, James D. “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country.” Journal of Economic 
Growth 8 (2003):  195–222. 
Fearon, James D and David D. Laitin. “Ordinary Language and External Validity.” 
September 2000. Accessed on July 18, 2012. 
http://web.ceu.hu/cps/bluebird/eve/statebuilding/fearon-laitin.pdf.  
Federal, Robert K. Decentralization and Development: The Indian Balancing Act. NPS 
Thesis (June 2008). Accessed on 11 Aug 2012. 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Jun/08Jun_Federal.pdf. 
Fisman, Raymond and Roberta Gatti. “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across 
Countries.” Journal of Public Economics 83 (2002): 325–345. 
Fjeldstad, Odd Helge.  “Decentralization and Corruption: Review of the Literature.”  
Bergen, Norway:  Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2003.  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.  “Country Experiences in 
Decentralization in South Asia,” February 24–26, 2004. Accessed September 28, 
2012.  http://coin.fao.org/cms/media/9/13171848129560/2004_11.pdf.   
Gahamanyi, Bibane Mbaye. “Rwanda: Building Constitutional order in the Aftermath of 
Genocide.” In Human Rights under African Constitutions, 252–294. Edited by 
Addullahi Ahmed An-Naim. Philadelphia, PN: Univ of Pennsylvania Press, 2003. 
Gerolymatos, Andre. The Balkan Wars:  Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the 
Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond. New York, NY:  Basic Books, 
2003. 
Gregorian, Vartan. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan:  Politics of Reform and 
Modernization, 1880–1946. Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1969. 
Harris, William. “Republic of Lebanon.” In The Government and Politics of the Middle 
East and North Africa, Sixth Edition. Edited by David E. Long, Bernard Reich, 
and Mark Gasiorowski, 231–266. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. 
Hayman, Rachel. The Complexity of Aid: Government Strategies, Donor Agendas and the 
Coordination of Development Assistance in Rwanda 1994–2000, PhD diss., 
School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh, 2006.  
Hayman, Rachel. “Going in the ‘Right’ Direction?” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 5, 
no.1 (July 2009):  51–75.  
 115 
Hazlewood, Arthur. The Economy of Kenya:  The Kenyatta Era. Oxford, UK:  Oxford 
University Press, 1979. 
Inbal, Aliza Belman and Hanna Lerner. “Constitutional Design, Identity, and Legitimacy 
in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.” In Governance in Post-Conflict Societies: 
Rebuilding Fragile States. Edited by Derick W. Brinkerhoff. New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2007. 
———. Institute of Economic Affairs. A Guide for Understanding Decentralization in 
Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya:  Pann Printers Ltd., 2011. 
———. International Crisis Group. Afghanistan:  The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 
Transition. October 8, 2012. Accessed October 24, 2012. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/236-
afghanistan-the-long-hard-road-to-the-2014-transition.aspx.  
———. International Crisis Group.  “Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary.”  
November 17, 2010. Accessed October 31, 2012. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/southasia/afghanistan/195%20Refo
rming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx.  
———. International Crisis Group.  “Bosnia’s Gordian Knot:  Constitutional Reform.”  
July 12, 2012. Accessed October 21, 2012.  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-
releases/2012/europe/bosnias-gordian-knot-constitutional-reform.aspx.  
———. International Crisis Group. Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: A New International 
Engagement Strategy. February 15, 2007. Accessed October 21, 2012.  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/180_ensuring_bosnias_future.  
Jalali, Ali. The Other Side of the Mountain:  Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan 
War. Quantico, VA:  U.S. Marine Corps, 1999. 
Jones, Robert. “USSOCOM Strategic Appreciation.” Lecture, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, March 1, 2012. 
Kakar, Mohammad Hasan. A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863–
1901. Leiden:  Brill, 2006. 
Kakar, Mohammad Hasan. Afghanistan:  A Study in Internal Political Developments, 
1880–1896. Kabul, Afghanistan:  Punjab University Press, 1971. 
Kamali, Muhammed Hashim. Law in Afghanistan:  A Study of the Constitution, 
Matrimonial Law and the Judiciary. Leiden:  E. J. Brill, 1985. 
 
 116 
Kanyinga, Karuti. Karuti Kanyinga, “Hobbling along to Payoffs:  The Kenya Grand 
Coalition Government.”  April 2009. Accessed October 21, 2012. 
http://www.american.edu/sis/africacouncil/upload/Paper-2a-Kenya-
coalition_govt-Kanyinga-draft.pdf.  
Kenney, Andria.  “Multi-Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya:  Ethnicity as a Foundation 
for Democratic Institutionalization.”  Adaptation of master’s thesis dissertation, 
Aalborg University, 2006. 
Kenya National Dialogue & Reconciliation. Accessed October 21, 2012.  
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/.  
Kasapovic, Mirjana.  “Bosnia and Herzegovina:  Consociational or Liberal Democracy?” 
Political Institutions and Political Processes XLII, no. 5 (2005):  3–30. 
Kauzya, John-Mary. “Decentralization: Prospects for Peace, Democracy and 
Development.” Discussion Paper, UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs. Division of Public Administration and Development Management, 2005. 
Kepel, Gilles. Fitna:  Guerre au Coeur de L’Islam. Paris:  Gallimard, 2004.  
Kimonyo, Jean-Paul, Noel Twagiramungu, and Christopher Kayumba. “Supporting the 
Post-Genocide Transition in Rwanda: The Role of the International Community.” 
Democratic Transition in Post-Conflict Societies Project, Working Paper 32, The 
Hague: Clingendael, 2004. 
Kodras, Janet. “Restructuring the State: Devolution, Privatization, and the Geographic 
Redistribution of Power and Capacity in Governance.” State Devolution in 
America: Implications for a Diverse Society. Edited by Lynn Staeheli, Janet 
Kodras, and Colin Flint, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews 48. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 1997, 79–96. 
Kothari, Rajni. “The Problem.” Seminar, no. 357 (1989):  31–35. 
Ledwidge, Frank.  “Justice and Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan:  A Missing Link,” 
The RUSI Journal 154, no. 1 (February 2009):  6–9. 
Lijphart, Arend. “Consociational Democracy.” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969):  207–225. 
Lijphart, Arend. Demokracija u pluralnim drustvima. Skolska knjiga, Zagreb:  Globus, 
 1992. 
Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. 
Lijphart, Arend. “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation.” In 
The American Political Science Review 90, no. 2 (June 1996):  258–268. 
 117 
Lijphart, Arend.  “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies.”  Journal of Democracy 
15, no. 2 (April 2004):  96–109. 
Lijphart, Arend.   Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, CT:  Yale University 
Press, 1977. 
Lijphart, Arend. Power-sharing in South Africa. Berkeley, CA:  University of California, 
1985. 
Linz, Juan J.  “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:  Does It Make a Difference?” In 
The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Edited by Juan J. Linz and Arturo 
Valenzuela, 3–87. Baltimore, MD:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
Lister, Sarah.  “Understanding State-building and Local Government in Afghanistan.” 
London, UK:  Crisis States Research Centre, 2007. 
Makdisi, Samir, Fadia Kiwan and Marcus Marktanner. “Lebanon: The Constrained 
Democracy and Its National Impact.” In Democracy in the Arab World: 
Explaining the Deficit. Edited by Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi, 115–141. 
New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. 
Mani, Devyani. “Decentralization, Governance & the New Planning for Local-Level 
Development.” New Regional Development Paradigms Vol. 3. Edited by Walter 
B. Stohr and Josefa S. Edralin. Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Press, 2001. 
Accessed on August 10, 2012. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/Doc?id=10004893&ppg=37.  
Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder.  “Democratization and War.”  Foreign Affairs 
74, no. 3 (1995):  79–97. 
Makdisi, Samir and Marcus Marktanner. “Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of 
Lebanon.” Paper presented in American University of Beirut, 2009. Accessed on 
23 Sep 2012.  http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume11/PDFS/Paper-by-
Makdisi&Marktanner.pdf. 
Makoloo, Maurice Odhiambo. Kenya:  Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic 
Diversity. London, UK:  Minority Rights Group International, 2005. 
Maupeu, Herve.  “Revisiting Post-Election Violence.”  In The General Elections in 
Kenya, 2007. Edited by Jerome Lafargue, 193–230. Dar es Salaam:  Mkuki na 
Nyota Publishers, Ltd., 2008. 
McCulloch, Allison.  “Seeking Stability amid Deep Division:  Consociationalism and 
Centripetalism in Comparative Perspective.”  PhD thesis, Queens University, 
2009. 
 118 
Menon, Balakrishna, James Mutero, and Simon Macharia.  “Decentralization and Local 
Governments in Kenya.”  December 2008. Accessed October 21, 2012.  
http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/ispwp0832.pdf.   
———. MGRI. Minority Rights Group International Report (2005). April 13, 2005. 
Accessed October 21, 2012.  http://www.minorityrights.org/1050/reports/kenya-
minorities-indigenous-peoples-and-ethnic-diversity.html.  
Muigai, Githu.  “Jomo Kenyatta and the Rise of the Ethno-nationalist State in Kenya.”  In 
Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa. Edited by Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and 
Will Kymlicka, 200–217. Oxford, UK:  James Currey, 2004. 
Nawid, Senzil K. Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan, 1919–1929:  King 
Aman-Allah and the Afghan Ulama. Costa Mesa, CA:  Mazda Publishers, 1999. 
Nixon, Hamish. Subnational State-Building in Afghanistan. April 2008. Accessed 
October 24, 2012. 
http://areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=65&ContentId=7&ParentId=7&
Lang=en-U.S.  
Norris, Pippa. Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies:  Do 
Power-sharing Institutions Work?  January 18, 2005. Accessed October 21, 2012. 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Powersharing%20solutions.pdf.  
Norris, Pippa. “Federalism and Decentralization.” Driving Democracy: Do Power-
Sharing Institutions Work. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Nyanjom, Othieno. Devolution in Kenya’s New Constitution. Nairobi, Kenya:  The Regal 
Press Kenya Ltd., 2011. 
Nyukuri, Barasa Kundu. The Impact of Past and Potential Ethnic Conflicts on Kenyan’s 
Stability and Development. Nairobi, Kenya:  University of Nairobi, 1997. 
Odhiambo, E. S. Atieno.  “Hegemonic Enterprises and the Instrumentalities of Survival:  
Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya.”  In Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa. 
Edited by Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, 167–182. Oxford, 
UK:  James Currey, 2004.   
———. Office of the High Representative.  “Introduction and General Information.” 
Accessed October 21, 2012.  http://www.ohr.int/.  
O’Neil, Patrick H., Karl Fields and Don Share. Cases in Comparative Politics. New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010. 
Osborne, David and T. Gaebler. Reinventing Government. New York: Addison Wesley, 
1992. 
 119 
Poullada, Leon B. Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929. Ithaca, NY:  
Cornell University Press, 1973. 
———. “Political Pluralism and Power Sharing in Rwanda.” Center for Conflict 
Management of the National University of Rwanda (2010). Accessed on 20 Sep 
2012.  http://www.undp.org.rw/political-power-sharing-in-rwanda.pdf. 
Prud’homme, Remy. “The Dangers of Decentralization.” World Bank Research Observer 
10, no. 2, (1995):  201–220. 
Prunier, Gérard. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959–1994. London: Hurst 
and Company, 1997. 
———. “Rwanda.” CIA The World Fact Book. Accessed on 27 Sep 2012. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html. 
Reilly, Ben and Andrew Reynolds. Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies. 
Washington, DC:  National Academy Press, 1998. 
Reilly, Robert.  “Shaping Strategic Communication.”  In Afghan Endgames. Edited by 
Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, 169–191. Washington, DC:  Georgetown 
University Press, 2012. 
Roberts, Mara J.  “Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya.”  
September 2009. Accessed October 21, 2012.  
http://www.ndpmetrics.com/papers/Kenya_Conflict_2007.pdf.  
Rondinelli, Dennis A. “Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: 
Theory and Practice in Developing Countries.” International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 47 (1981): 133–145. 
Rothschild, Donald and Michael Foley.  “African States and the Politics of Inclusive 
Coalitions.”  In The Precarious Balance:  State and Society in Africa. Edited by 
Donald Rothschild and Michael Foley, 233–264. Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 
1988. 
Ruttig, Thomas.  “The Failure of Airborne Democracy:  The Bonn Agreement and 
Afghanistan’s Stagnating Democratisation.”  In Snapshots of an Intervention:  
The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan’s Decade of Assistance (2001–11). Edited 
by Martine van Bijlert and Sari Kouvo, 3–12. Kabul, Afghanistan:  Afghanistan 
Analysts Network, 2012. 
Ruttig, Thomas. “Afghanistan’s ‘Cumulative’ Protests and the West’s Dilemma.” 
Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 3, 2012. Accessed on March 5, 2012. 
http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2567.     
 120 
Salamey, Imad. “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options.” In 
International Journal of Peace Studies 14, no.2 ( Autumn/Winter 2009): 83–105. 
Accessed on 23 Sep 2012. 
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol14_2/SALAMEY%20-
%2014n2%20IJPS.pdf 
Smooha, Sammy.  “Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict Management in 
Ethnically Divided Societies.”  Nations and Nationalism 4, no. 4 (2002): 423–
431. 
Sarajlic, Eldar.  “The Convenient Consociation:  Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnopolitics 
and the EU.” 2010. Accessed October 21, 2012.  
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/publications/0_1643_theconvenientconso
ciationbosniaandherzeg.pdf.  
Saunders, Cheryl. “Options for Decentralizing Power: Federalism to Decentralization.” 
Constitution Making. Org: Resources for Constitution Making. Accessed on July 
07, 2012.  http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/federalism.pdf.  
Sen, Gita. “Empowerment as an Approach to poverty.” Working Paper 97–07, 
Background Paper for the Human Development Report, Harvard University, 
Global Reproductive Health Forum (December 1997). 
Shurkin, Michael. Subnational Government in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA:  RAND 
Corporation, 2011. 
Singh, Naresh. “Decentralization and Legal Empowerment of the Poor.”In Decentralizing 
Governance. Edited by G Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A.  Rondinelli, 229–241. 
Washington, DC:  Brookings Institute Press, 2007. 
Snyder, Jack. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New  
York, NY:  W.W. Norton, 2000. 
 
———. Society for International Development.  “Pulling Apart:  Facts and Figures on 
Inequality in Kenya.” 2004. Accessed October 21, 2012.  
http://www.sidint.net/docs/pullingapart-mini.pdf.  
Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach.  “Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative  
Perspective.”  In The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Edited by Juan J. Linz  
And Arturo Valenzuela, 119–136. Baltimore, MD:  Johns Hopkins University  
Press, 1994. 
 
Straus, Scott and Lars Waldorf. “Introduction: Seeing Like a Post-Conflict State.” In 
Remaking Rwanda, 3–21. Edited by Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf. Madison, 
Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press. 2011.  
 121 
Stroh, Alexander. “The Effects of Electoral Institutions in Rwanda: Why Proportional 
Representation Supports the Authoritarian Regime.” In GIGA Working Papers 
105, July 2009. Accessed on 28 Sep 2012. http://repec.giga-
hamburg.de/pdf/giga_09_wp105_stroh.pdf. 
Suhrke, Astri and Kaja Borchgrevink.  “Afghanistan:  Justice Sector Reform.”  In New 
Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding. Edited by Edward Newman, Roland Paris, 
and Oliver P. Richmond, 178–200. New York, NY:  United Nations University 
Press, 2009. 
Taizi, Dr. Sherman. Jirga System in Tribal Life, University of Peshawar, April 2007. 
Teuteberg, Salomé Marjanne. “The Endurance of Lebanese Consociational Democracy.” 
Master’s Thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2011. Accessed on 23 Sep 2012, 
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/6577. 
———. The Fund for Peace. “Failed States Index 2006.” Accessed on July 18, 2012. 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2006.   
———. The Fund for Peace. “Failed States Index 2011.” Accessed on July 18, 2012. 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-11–14-fs-failedstatesindex2011–
1106p.pdf.   
———. The Fund for Peace. “Conflict Assessment Indicators.” Accessed on July 18, 
2012. http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-10–97-ca-
conflictassessmentindicators-1105c.pdf.  
———. United Nations.  “Democracy and the United Nations.”  Accessed July 26, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/democracyday/pdf/infokit.pdf.  
———. U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants.  “World Refugee Survey 2003 - 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”  June 1, 2003. Accessed October 21, 2012. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCRI,,BIH,,3eddc4962,0.html.  
———. United States Special Operations Command Directorate for Intelligence.  
“Village Stability Operations 101:  Understanding USSOCOM’s Role in VSO and 
ALP in Afghanistan and Beyond.”  The Donovan Review, 2nd Edition, January 
2012. 
Welle-Strand, Anne, Kristian Kjollesdal, and Nick Sitter.  “Assessing Microfinance:  The 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Case.”  Managing Global Transitions 8, no. 2 (2010): 
145–166. 
Woodward, Susan L. “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Civil Wars, Insecurity and 
Intervention. Edited by Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, 73–115. New York, 
NY:  Columbia University Press, 1999. 
 122 
Work, Robertson. “Decentralization, Governance, and Sustainable Regional 
Development.” In New Regional Development Paradigms 3. Edited by Walter B. 
Stohr and Josefa S. Edralin, 21–33. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. 
———. World Bank. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Subnational Expenditures 




———. World Bank. Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-National Level in 
Afghanistan. July 2007. Accessed October 24, 2012. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448
813–1185293547967/4024814–1185293572457/report.pdf.  
Zupcevic, Merima and Fikret Causevic.  “Case Study:  Bosnia and Herzegovina.”  




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
 
